IN the first months of the war many efforts had been made to
conduct our operations in a way that would cause the enemy such losses as would
enable us to speak of a real equalisation of forces. But in vain. The results
of our mine-laying were unknown, while the successes of our submarines did not
weigh much in the scale, as the ships they torpedoed had no fighting value. On
the other hand, raids by our cruisers were much more likely to bring
considerable portions of the English Fleet out of their harbours and thus give
our Fleet a favourable chance of intervening if it kept in close touch with its
cruisers. For this purpose our cruisers would in any case have to go far beyond
the limits of distance they had hitherto observednot more than 100
nautical miles from Heligoland. Then only would our cruisers begin to have some
real effect. Within the limits imposed upon him the Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet had described the efforts we had madecruisers had put to sea,
minelaying was carried out continuously in spite of the losses we had suffered,
submarines had done far more than was expected of them, were untiring in their
efforts and had penetrated as far as the English coasts, yet for the Fleet
itself these operations had proved a disappointment. Strategical reasons had
made it necessary to keep our Fleet back, and this looked like a want of
confidence and affected the moral of the men, and gradually lowered their
belief in their own efficiency to a regrettable degree. An impressive recital
of these facts with the request that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet should
be allowed greater latitude was met with a decided rebuff. The grounds of this
refusal, as communicated by the Naval Staff, ran somewhat as follows:
"The existence of our Fleet, ready to strike at any moment,
has hitherto kept the enemy away from the North Sea and Baltic coasts and made
it possible to resume trade with neutral countries in the Baltic. The Fleet has
thus taken over the protection of the coast and troops required for that
purpose are now available for use in the field. After even a successful battle,
the ascendancy of the Fleet under the numerical superiority of the enemy would
give way, and under the pressure of the enemy Fleet the attitude of the
neutrals would be prejudiciously influenced. The Fleet must therefore be held
back and avoid actions which might lead to heavy losses. This does not,
however, prevent favourable opportunities being made use of to damage the
enemy. An employment of the Fleet outside the German Bight, which the enemy
tries to bring about through his movements in the Skagerrak, is not mentioned
in the orders for operations as being one of the favourable opportunities.
There is nothing to be said against an attempt of the big cruisers in the North
Sea to damage the enemy.."
These instructions served the purpose of the further
enterprise against the English coast. On December l5 the big cruisers under the
command of Vice-Admiral Hipper sailed under orders to bombard the fortified
coast towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool and to lay mines along the coast, for
there was constant traffic between the East Coast ports. Both these places,
however, are 150 nautical miles nearer to the chief bases of the English Fleet
in the North of the British Isles than is Yarmouth. It would, therefore, be
much easier for vessels lying there or cruising at sea in the vicinity to beat
off an attack, and the expedition would probably present a much greater risk,
and a more urgent call for support from the Fleet.
The 2nd Scouting Division, composed of light cruisers and
two torpedo-boat flotillas, was attached to the 1st Scouting Division of
battle-cruisers. They left the Jade on the 15th at 3 A.M., followed late in the
afternoon of the same day by squadrons of battleships. The hour of departure
for both divisions was chosen in order to profit by the darkness and if
possible put to sea unobserved. Judging from what ensued, this appears to have
succeeded. A rendezvous at sea at 54° 30' N. Lat. and 7° 42' E. long.
was appointed for the squadrons coming from the Jade and the Elbe. In order to
get there I left the anchorage at Cuxhaven with Squadron II at 4 P.M. From the
meeting-place Squadron II took the course ordered by the
Commander-in-ChiefW.N.W. by ½W. at a speed of 15 knots. As all the
ships were most carefully darkened, nothing could be seen of the other
squadrons. The navigation had therefore to be most accurate in order that the
squadrons might be in their proper places the next morning. Seven to five
nautical miles had been determined on as the distance between the squadrons
from flagship to flagship. The sailing order of the units was: Squadrons I, III
and II. To ensure the safety of the Main Fleet when under way, the two older
armoured cruisers, Prinz Heinrich and Roon, were placed ahead,
together with a torpedo-boat flotilla. To cover the flanks two light cruisers
were utilised, each with a flotilla. The light cruiser Stettin, with two
flotillas, covered the rear. During the night several fishing steamers were
stopped by the escorting torpedo-boats but released as non-suspect.
At 5.20 A.M. a torpedo-boat in the vanguard reported four
enemy destroyers in Square 105. This was at 54° 55' N. Lat. and 2° 10,
E. Long. This spot was about 20 nautical miles north-west of the appointed
meeting-place for the cruisers, to which destination the Commander-in-Chief of
the Fleet was also steaming. As several hours must elapse before we could reach
our destination, and no further message followed the first one, we continued on
our way. An hour later there was another message from a torpedo-boat in the
vanguard to the effect that ten enemy destroyers had been sighted and that
flashes from guns were visible. A quarter of an hour later the same boat
reported that a chase had started. Thereupon at 6.45 the Commander-in-Chief
gave the signal for all the squadrons to turn into a S.E. course as it still
wanted an hour and a half to daylight. By issuing that order he carried out his
purpose of avoiding an encounter with the enemy torpedo-boats and denying them
the opportunity to attack in the dark.
Meanwhile our vanguard had begun to fight with the enemy
destroyers. At 6.58 the light cruiser Hamburg (Captain von Gaudecker)
reported that he had sunk an enemy destroyer. At 7.10 the Fleet turned again to
the E.S.E.- ½ E. and started! on the return journey.
It had passed considerably beyond the arc from Terschelling
to Horns Reef that shuts off the Bight. Having set out with the object of
supporting our cruisers, there was now no possibility of carrying out that
plan, seeing the great distance that lay between the two divisions. In this
case, therefore, the success of the cruisers' enterprise was entirely dependent
on their taking the enemy by surprise and avoiding the enemy's superior forces.
Towards daybreak, when our cruisers were approaching the
English coast, the wind rose to such a pitch and the sea ran so high that the
light cruiser Strassburg reported at 7 A.M. that, owing to heavy seas
off the land, firing was no longer possible and the ship had been obliged to
turn on an easterly course. As, under these conditions, the light cruisers and
torpedo-boats could only be a hindrance to the big cruisers, the
Commander-in-Chief decided to dispatch those vessels in the direction of the
Main Fleet, with the exception of the light cruiser Kolberg, which was
to continue laying mines at the places determined on.
The big cruisers then divided into two groups for the
bombardment of the coastal towns, the northern section, the Seydlitz,
Moltke and Blücher, making for Hartlepool. An officer of one of
the U-boats who had reconnoitred the area beforehand rendered good service in
locating the place. Shortly before they were off Hartlepool the cruisers were
attacked by four torpedo-boat destroyers of the " River " class that ran out to
sea and were brought under fire at a distance of about 50 hm. The sinking of
one destroyer and heavy damage to another were observed. After firing some
torpedoes without any result, they turned away. We gave up pursuing them so as
not to lose time for the bombardment. The Seydlitz opened fire on the
Cemetery Battery and scored several hits, so that at last the fire was only
returned by one 15 cm. gun and one light gun from the battery. The
Moltke was hit above the water-line, causing much damage between decks
but no loss of life. From the first, the Blücher came under a
lively fire from the land batteries; she had nine killed and three wounded by
one hit alone. 15 cm. howitzers and light artillery were used on land; the
Blücher was hit six times altogether.
The southern group, Von der Tann and
Derfflinger, made for Scarborough which was easily distinguishable. The
coastguard station at Scarborough and the signalling and coastguard stations at
Whitby were destroyed. At the latter place the second round brought down the
signalling flagstaff with the English ensign and the entire station building as
well. The Derfflinger also bombarded trenches and barracks at
Scarborough. As there was no counteraction it must be assumed that the battery
at Scarborough was either not manned in proper time, or had been evacuated by
the garrison.
The light cruiser Kolberg laid her mines at the
appointed place without much difficulty, although the ship heeled over to 12
degrees and the tip apparatus (for dropping the mines overboard) drew water. At
9.45 the cruisers assembled round the Seydlitz and started to retire in
the direction of the meeting-place agreed on with the Main Fleet. An hour
later, at 10.45, a wireless message was received from the Chief of
Reconnaissance with the Fleet that the task was accomplished and that he was
stationed at 54° 45' N., 0° 30' W. At 12.30 noon the Stralsund,
of the Second Scouting Division, with Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II attached,
sighted a number of enemy cruisers and, turning in a south-westerly direction,
evaded them to try and join the large cruisers. The English cruisers were again
lost to sight, as the weather was very misty. Soon afterwards the
Stralsund sighted six large enemy ships which were made out to be
battleships of the " Orion " class, and therefore the Second English Battle
Squadron. The Stralsund kept in touch with them and continued to report
on the course and the speed of the enemy. At 1 P.M. these groups were at
54° 20' N. lat., 2° 0' E. long. This report caused our big cruisers to
turn off in a north-easterly direction, as owing to the bad visibility they
were compelled to avoid an unexpected encounter with battleships of superior
fighting strength than that of our own. At that time the position of the two
forces facing each other was approximately as follows:
Great disappointment was caused on board my flagship by
this report. If our big cruisers had got into difficulties between the enemy
battle-squadron and other cruisers already reported and still in the vicinity,
our help would be too late. There was no longer any possibility while it was
still day of coming up with the enemy battle-squadron, which at one o'clock was
130 nautical miles distant from us. Our premature turning on to a E.S.E. course
had robbed us of the opportunity of meeting certain divisions of the enemy
according to the prearranged plan, which was now seen to have been correct. At
all events the restrictions imposed on the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
brought about the failure of the bold and promising plan, owing to its not
having been carried out in the proper manner. As we now know from an English
source, the destroyers fired at by the Hamburg were about 10 nautical miles in
front of the Second Battle Squadron which had come down on a southerly
coursethe vanguard of which had got into touch with ours between 6 and 7
A.M.; and since the position at 1 P.M., reported by the Stralsund,
coincides exactly with the English statement, it proves that at 7 A.M. both the
main fleets were only about 50 nautical miles apart. It is extremely probable
that by continuing in our original direction the two courses would have crossed
within sight of each other during the morning.
The advantage in a battle ensuing therefrom was distinctly
on our side. The English had at their disposal on the spot the Second Battle
Squadron with six ships, the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron with four ships was
within attacking distance, and added to these were a few light cruisers and the
Third Cruiser Squadron attached to the Second Battle Squadron.
According to his own statement, the English admiral in
command did not leave Scapa Flow with the other ships till 12 noon, after
receiving news of the bombardment at 9 A.M. He could not possibly have been in
time; while the Third English Squadron, which had been sighted at lo o'clock,
would not have had the advantage over our Fleet.
On the part of the English, disappointment was felt that
coastal towns had again been bombarded by our cruisers and that they could not
succeed in stopping it, although the necessary forces chanced to be at sea and
had even got into touch with our light cruisers. This, according to Admiral
Jellicoe's account, may have been due to the fact that the squadrons at sea had
received instructions from him how to act so as to cut off the enemy, but had
also had direct orders from the English Admiralty which were totally different
and which were acted upon by Sir George Warrender, in command of the Second
Battle Squadron.
The weather conditions were remarkable on that day. In the
east section of the North Seathe area through which our Fleet had
passedthere was a slight easterly wind, no sea running, and perfect
visibility. At the 3rd deg. E. Long. there was a sharply defined spot where the
weather changed. A north-westerly storm raged off the English coast and the sea
was correspondingly rough, making it extremely difficult to serve the guns even
on board the big cruisers. Between 9 A.M. and 2 P.M., as our Fleet withdrew, an
extraordinary number of drifting mines were observed, more than 70, some of
them already exploded. They must have broken loose from the big minefield at
the entrance to the Canal. It was a lucky chance that we escaped damage when,
on the preceding night, the ships passed through that area without being able
to observe them. At 8 P.M. on December 16, Squadron II ran into the Elbe again,
and the others returned to the Jade.
The impression that a specially favourable opportunity had
been missed still prevailed, and the chance of another such arising could
hardly be expected.
The behaviour of the English Fleet makes it obvious that our
advance was a complete surprise to them, nor had they counted on our Main Fleet
pushing forward to the Dogger Bank. Otherwise the English expedition would
surely have comprised stronger forces than merely one battle squadron, a
battle-cruiser squadron, and lighter forces. This combination certainly made
them superior to our cruiser attack but not to an attack by our Fleet. The
information that besides the German ships in action off the English coast a
still greater number were out at sea was communicated to the English
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at 2 P.M. by the English Admiralty.
The English received the news through their " directional
stations " which they already had in use, but which were only introduced by us
at a much later period. They are wireless stations for taking the directional
bearings of wireless messages, and in combination are capable of indicating the
direction from which intercepted wireless messages come and thus locating the
signalling ship's station. The stretch of the English east coast is very
favourable for the erection of these "directional stations." In possessing them
the English had a very great advantage in the conduct of the war, as they were
able thus to obtain quite accurate information as to the locality of the enemy
as soon as any wireless signals were sent by him. In the case of a large fleet,
where separate units are stationed far apart and communication between them is
essential, an absolute cessation of all wireless intercourse would be fatal to
any enterprise.
Towards the end of December a change was made in the
squadron command. Other ships had been added to Squadron III since the
declaration of war. The König, Grosser Kurfürst and
Markgraf had all made their trial trips. The Kronprinz was very
near completion and on January 2 was enrolled as the eighth ship in the
squadron. I was entrusted with the command of this squadron. It was no easy
matter for me to separate from Squadron II, which had been under my command for
nearly two whole years, as I had learnt to value the splendid spirit of the
crews, who, in spite of the inferior fighting powers of the ships, made it a
point of honour never to be behindhand in anything. But personal feelings were
not to be considered, and I had to look upon it as a great distinction that the
command of our most powerful fighting squadron was given to me. The command of
Squadron I I was taken over on December 26 by Rear-Admiral Funke, whereupon I
left for Wilhelmshaven to take up my position on the Prinz Regent
Liutpold.
The ensuing time was fully occupied in learning to know the
peculiarities of the new class of ship and the standard of fighting power of
each individual vessel, and in judging the personality of the commanders and
the corps of officers. The prevailing conditions of war made it more difficult
to cultivate close relations with them than would have been the case in peace
time. My chief object was so to train the unit as to make it absolutely
reliable for implicit obedience to commands. I applied, therefore, to the
Commander-in-Chief for an opportunity for a period of training in the Baltic
towards the end of January. This was all the more necessary in view of the fact
that since they were commissioned the four ships of the "König" class had
had no practice in torpedo firing.
From a military point of view torpedo firing practice is an
urgent necessity in the training and further development of all torpedo
officers, those who are in charge of the torpedo tubes, and of those in
reserve, in order to prove that the results from the use of the weapon are
equal to expectations. Particular attention must be given to range practice and
angle-discharging, which make a great demand on the ability of the torpedo men.
During the war many ships were provided with torpedoes with all the latest
improvements, without the crew having had an opportunity to fire them or become
familiar with the handling of them. Experience showed that it was necessary to
test every torpedo that had lain unused for more than five months to make sure
that it would act when needed.
So long as enemy submarines remained in those waters the
inner Bight of the North Sea was not a suitable place for gun-practice; these
craft could not have had a better opportunity for firing their torpedoes. The
mouths of the rivers certainly offered chances to our gunners of practice on
objects passing by, but there was very little scope for gun practice at long
range under fighting conditions. The necessity of combining the training period
with the time required for unavoidable repairs, as also with the war activities
of the Fleet which called for the participation of the highest possible number
of ships, was a matter of extreme difficulty from the point of view of
organisation.
Before Squadron III could sail for the Baltic there was to
be another enterprise by the Fleet in the North Sea, which, owing to bad
weather, was postponed from day to day. January, 1915, opened with most
unfavourable weather, and one violent storm followed rapidly on another. But
when, in searching for a passage for the Fleet through the minefields, it was
discovered that many new ones had been laid down, both north of Amrum and west
of Borkum, and also in the gap between Norderney and the safety barrier we had
put down, the plan for an advance by the Fleet was abandoned. These mines would
first have had to be removed, which would have been slow work owing to the bad
weather. Instead of a big action by the Fleet, two light cruisers went out to
lay mines and succeeded in placing a barrier 50 nautical miles from the English
coast, close to the mouth of the Humber, presumably just in the enemy's
outgoing course.
Towards the middle of the month the Fleet was kept at a
high pitch of readiness as there was reason to believe the English were
planning a blockade of our estuaries. The idea was extremely probable, as the
poor visibility in winter weather offered the most favourable conditions for
carrying it out. In the Jade particularly the channel for large vessels was so
narrow and so shallow that the traffic was greatly hindered, especially in the
case of certain vessels. There could be no warding off such an attack by a
coast battery, as Wangeroog was not yet fortified. In any case, we could not
afford to over-estimate the difficulty of carrying out such an undertaking; in
view of the vast amount of material possessed by England for such a purpose,
success in it was by no means out of the question. The fact that the Fleet
would be obliged to push the undertaking to our very river mouths doubtless
formed their chief reason for not making such an attempt, the success of which
would have been very detrimental to the carrying out of our U-boat and mining
warfare.
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