On the morning of January 19, an aeroplane having sighted
60 miles north-west of Heligoland numerous English ships bound on an easterly
course, among them several battle-cruisers and close upon 100 small craft, we
made sure that their plan was to be put into execution. It is quite possible
that the aeroplane was mistaken as to the number and type of the ships,
although the report was confirmed from another sourcetwo U-boats that
returned from sea. However, the torpedo-boats which were sent out to
reconnoitre and to attack at night if necessary saw nothing of the enemy
forces, so they probably had withdrawn early. At any rate we considered the
danger of a blockade to be at an end.
On January 21 Squadron III sailed for the Elbe. During the
passage there was a violent snowstorm which made it very difficult to locate
the mouth of the river. Owing to the rapidly falling depth of water as shown by
the soundings taken, we were forced to anchor, a manuvre carried out in
exemplary fashion by the big ships, in spite of the current and the mist. It
showed very clearly the difference between the navigation of a squadron of such
large vessels and that of Squadron II where the ships had not half the
displacement. The next morning the weather was calm and clear, and the passage
through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was accomplished without accident. It took us
only 10 hours to cover the long stretch of 100 kilometres from the lock gates
at Brunnsbüttel to the entrance into the lock at Holtenau in Kiel Harbour.
While the training of Squadron III was proceeding in the
Baltic, the first regular cruiser action took place in the North Sea.
BATTLE OF CRUISERS OFF THE DOGGER BANK
After a long period of inaction, the weather being
apparently favourable, the commander of the scouting ships was ordered on
January 23 to reconnoitre off the Dogger Bank with the cruisers of the 1st and
2nd Scouting Divisions, the First Leader of the Torpedo-boat Forces, and the
Second Flotilla, and there to destroy any of the enemy's light forces to be met
with. They were to set out in the evening, when darkness fell, and were
expected back the following evening when it was again dark.
The speed of the advance was to be such that the cruisers,
at daybreak on the 24th, would have reached the south-east edge of the Dogger
Bank. It was not intended to push farther on towards the Bank while it was
still dark, otherwise enemy forces might make their way unobserved in between
Heligoland and the cruisers. On the way there no trade or fishing steamers were
to be examined, if it could be avoided, so as not to be forced to leave any of
our torpedo boats behind; but the plan of action for the homeward run included
the examination and, where necessary, seizure of all the fishing steamers
encountered.
The big cruiser Von der Tann was missing from our
cruiser squadron, being in dock for urgently needed repairs, as was also the
light cruiser Strassburg. The fighting force, therefore, comprised the cruisers
Seydlitzthe flagship of Rear-Admiral Hipper Derfflinger,
Moltke and Blücher, the light cruisers Graudenz, Stralsund,
Kolberg and Rostock, Torpedo-Boat Flotilla V, and the 2nd and 18th
Half-Flotillas. The Graudenz and Stralsund formed the vanguard,
the flanks were supported by the Rostock on the starboard and by the
Kolberg on the larboard side. A half flotilla was attached to each light
cruiser.
At 8.15 A.M. on the 24th the Kolberg encountered an
enemy light cruiser and destroyers. The enemy's signal of recognition was
answered by the Kolberg turning on the searchlight and shortly
afterwards opening fire, which was returned a few minutes later. The
Kolberg was hit twice and had two men killed. At the same time she
sighted thick clouds of smoke in a west-southwesterly direction, and the
Stralsund also reported to the same effect to the north-earth-west.
The conclusion thus to be drawn was that other and more
numerous forces were lying off the Dogger Bank.
After Admiral Hipper had picked up the Kolberg he
assembled his group on a south-easterly course, as it was still not
sufficiently light to make out the number and type of the enemy forces. While
the ships were assembling, £our cruisers of the "Town " class, three
cruisers of the " Arethusa " class, and a large number of destroyers were
sighted on a parallel course north of our cruisers, but out of gun range. The
Blücher was able to count more than twenty destroyers. Further
clouds of smoke could be seen in their rear, and the Stralsund reported that at
least eight large ships were observable in a north-north-westerly direction.
Admiral Hipper was bound therefore to assume that at the
rear of these numerous light forces there must be other and stronger groups of
ships, and, as he could not count on any support from our own Main Fleet, he
decided to push on full speed ahead in a south-easterly direction. The
torpedo-boats were sent on ahead. The Blücher, being the rear ship,
was permitted at discretion to open fire, as some of the destroyers to the
north approached very near, while the light cruisers with them stood off
farther to the north.
At 9.35 A.M., however, five thick clouds of smoke were
observed from starboard in a west to west-north-west direction, which were soon
made out to be from the 1st English Battle-Cruiser Squadron. They came up at
full speed and opened fire at a great distance, about 200 hm., and, at first at
any rate, without reaching our cruisers.
The naval command at Wilhelmshaven received the first news
of the encounter of our cruisers with the enemy at 8.50 A.M., when the Seydlitz
reported herself as being at 54° 53' N. Lat. and 3° 30' E. Long.,
course S.E., speed 20 knots, and had sighted eight large ships, one light
cruiser and twelve destroyers. The command at once issued orders for special
preparation on board all ships and torpedo-boat flotillas and assembled them in
the Schillig Roads. As the way to the Bight was open to our cruisers, and they
were in touch with the enemy forces in the rear, it was assumed that so far our
ships were not in any danger. Towards 10.30 A.M. the squadrons were all
assembled in the Schillig Roads, and ran out to sea at 11.10, as a wireless
message had come from the Admiral at II o'clock, saying he was in urgent need
of support. He was then at 54° 30' N. Lat. and 4° 35' E. Long.
These forces were, however, not called upon to take any
active part in the battle, as the further development of the fighting at that
time showed it to be unnecessary.
Meanwhile the situation of the cruisers had developed as
follows: At 10 A.M. our large cruisers were lying on a south-easterly course,
so that all the ships could open fire from the starboard on the English large
cruisers. Our light cruisers and both the flotillas were ahead of our large
cruisers, slightly on the starboard side.
The enemy battle-cruisers came up very rapidly, and must
have made a speed of at least 26 knots.¹
Our 1st Scouting Division was not favourably situated, owing
to the prevailing east-north-east wind. There was nothing for it, however, but
to keep to the south-east course, leading to the Bight, as the main direction
for the fighting. The chances of support from our own forces were greater
there, and the farther we could succeed in drawing the enemy into the Bight the
greater prospect there would be of setting torpedo-boats on him during the
ensuing night. Any other course leading farther south or still farther west
would not greatly have improved the smoke conditions, but would from the first
have placed the enemy battle-cruisers in a frontal position. On the other hand,
a north-easterly course, so as to have the wind ahead, would have carried our
forces straight up against the enemy destroyers, and thus offered them a good
opportunity for attack. Soon after 10 o'clock our large cruisers opened fire at
180 hm.; the enemy manuvred so as to avoid our fire. At the same time our
cruisers also turned about between E.S.E. and S.E. to a S. course. The range
for the leading ship, the Seydlitz, varied between 180 to 145 hm. The
enemy had separated and formed two groups, the leading one having three, and
the other two ships.²
They were trying to keep at the farthest firing distance.
Soon after the fighting began the Seydlitz was badly hit and both her
after turrets, with their two 28-cm. guns, were put out of action, while fires
were caused in them by the exploding ammunition. The gunners in both turrets
were killed, and the turrets themselves jammed and put out of action. Owing to
the fire, which took a long time to extinguish, the munition chamber had to be
flooded.
Meanwhile some of the light cruisers and destroyers were
steaming up on the larboard [port] side, so that the near ships could fire on
them occasionally. In doing so Blücher, the last ship, hit and
heavily damaged a destroyer. At 11.30 the enemy appeared to be drawing nearer;
at the same time the Blücher reported engine trouble and dropped slowly to
the rear.
The order "Flotilla clear for attack " was then sent to the
torpedo-boat leader. At 11.45 the leading enemy ship, with a heavy list on,
turned off and drew out of the line. The ship following after her passed the
leader, so as to keep up the running fight. The other enemy battle-cruisers
followed at irregular distances. At 12 o'clock our cruisers turned towards the
enemy, and the torpedo-boats were ordered to attack. The enemy battlecruisers
then turned at once to a northerly course to evade the torpedo-boats and to
turn on the Blücher, which had been left behind. In view of this
manuvre the torpedo-boats were recalled from the attack.
Our cruisers now took up a southerly course, intending to
open an encircling fight with the enemy, and if possible render help to the
Blücher. But both turrets on board the Seydlitz, with
two-fifths of the heavy guns, were definitely out of action, and the ship's
stern was full of water which had spread to the other parts from the flooding
of the munition chamber, so the Admiral of the cruisers therefore decided to
profit by the increased distance caused by the enemy's manuvre to turn
again to S.E. and break off the fight. At 1.45 the enemy was lost to view, the
Seydlitz being then '5 nautical miles north of the mouth of the Elbe.
At 3.30 P.M. the forces that had run out from the Jade
joined the returning cruisers and together entered the rivers.
Besides the explosion and the list on the leading enemy
ship, many other hits and a big fire on the second ship were observed. Several
officers asserted positively that they had seen one of the large cruisers sink,
which gave rise to the report that it was the battle-cruiser Tiger.
Contradictory reports from an English source appeared later in the Press and
confirmed the opinion that the English wished to conceal the fact. The airship
"L 5," which was hovering over the spot, reported that only four large ships
were seen to withdraw. The torpedo-boat "V 5," Lieut.-Commander von Eichhorn,
which, after being recalled from the attack, had dropped out from between the
two fighting lines, fired two torpedoes at 70 hm., and thereupon observed the
withdrawal of a battle-cruiser. There seems no obvious reason why the English
cruisers should so soon have stopped fighting after their leader fell out and
when the number of our cruisers had already dwindled to three, unless it was
because our guns had severely handled them.
On our side we deplored the loss of the Blücher.
Very soon after her engines were damaged another shot caused an explosion and a
fire amidships, apparently in the big ammunition chamber, situate in that part
of the vessel. It was observed how to the very last the ship's guns on both
sides fired on the battle-cruisers which concentrated their fire on that one
ship, as did also the numerous enemy light cruisers and destroyers, for whom
the wrecked ship was a welcome target, until at 1.7 P.M. she turned over and
sank. The survivors of the crew were picked up by English destroyers and other
ships that were at hand, among them being the gallant commander, Captain
Erdmann, who unfortunately died afterwards while a prisoner in England of
pneumonia, the result of the immersion in the cold sea after his ship had gone
down. The Derfflinger and Kolberg were slightly damaged; the
Seydlitz was badly hit a second time on her armoured belt, the plate
being pressed into the ship's side and causing a leakage. The first shell that
hit her had a terrible effect. It pierced right through the upper deck in the
ship's stern and through the barbette-armour of the near turret, where it
exploded. All parts of the stern, the officers' quarters, mess, etc., that were
near where the explosion took place were totally wrecked. In the reloading
chamber, where the shell penetrated, part of the charge in readiness for
loading was set on fire. The flames rose high up into the turret and down into
the munition chamber, and thence through a connecting door usually kept shut,
by which the men from the munition chamber tried to escape into the fore
turret. The flames thus made their way through to the other munition chamber,
and thence again up to the second turret, and from this cause the entire gun
crews of both turrets perished almost instantly. The flames rose as high as a
house above the turrets.
Up to 12 noon there had been no prospect of the
torpedo-boat flotillas making a successful attack; the distances were too
great. The torpedo-boats would have been obliged to get within 100 hm. of the
enemy to secure an opportunity of firing. When the distances were reduced and
there was an opening for attack the enemy turned away and gave up the fight. At
that time Admiral Beatty, leader of the English battle-cruisers, was not in
command. From information received later, it appeared he had stayed behind on
the Lion, and had then boarded a torpedo-boat to hurry after his ships,
but did not reach them till they were returning.³
The spot where the Blücher was sunk is at
54° 25' N. Lat., 5° 25' E. Long. When Admiral Hipper decided to break
off the fight he, according to his report, was guided by the conviction that it
would be of no avail to send help to the already sinking Blücher,
and in view Of the enemy's superior strength would only involve us in further
losses. The fighting had lasted more than three hours, and the Seydlitz
had only 200 rounds of ammunition for the guns. The Naval Command fully
recognised that no objection could be raised to the conduct of the forces in
the battle, or to the tactical measures adopted, and also approved of the
decision, hard though it was, to abandon the Blücher to her fate.
If our battle-cruisers, by turning round and risking the
three remaining cruisers, had approached the Blücher, then
unnavigable, they would have entangled themselves in the most unfavourable
tactical position imaginable, as their own torpedo-boats would have been astern
of them, while the enemy would have had his light cruisers and destroyers
directly ahead, and could have used them for a torpedo attack. The result was,
therefore, more than doubtful; there would probably have been heavy casualties
without corresponding loss on the other side, and the Blücher could not
possibly have been saved.
The enemy's behaviour obviously shows that it was his
intention, relying on the heavier calibre of his guns, to carry on the fighting
at the greatest distance, to knock out the central guns (15-cm.) of our ships,
and above all to keep themselves beyond the range of our torpedoes. It would
have been easy for him to draw nearer, as was proved when he steamed up so
quickly. His superior speed enabled him to select the range at his own
pleasure. In spite of superior guns and the more favourable position of the
English line, their firing in the protracted running fight was not very
successful when we take into consideration that three of their ships each had
eight 34-cm. guns and the two others each eight 30.5-cm. guns. Opposed to them
on our side were two ships each with ten 28-cm. guns, the Blücher
with twelve 21 cm., and the Derfflinger with eight 30.5-cm. It is not
surprising that the Blücher was destroyed by gun-fire; her armour
plating was not very thick, and, being the last ship of our line, most of the
enemy's fire was concentrated on her.
However regrettable was the great loss of life on board the
Seydlitz through the fire spreading to the munition chamber of each
turret, a valuable lesson had been learned for the future in dealing with
reserve ammunition, and it was applied in subsequent actions.
The unexpected presence of the English ships on the morning
of the 24th leads to the conclusion that the encounter was not a matter of
chance,, but that our plan in some way or other had got to the knowledge of the
English. The leader of our cruisers, seeing so many ships assembled, must have
considered it extremely probable that still more forces were behind. Whether
there was any other reason for such a concentration cannot be maintained with
certainty. It may possibly be that it was connected with the conduct of the
English on the 19th, or with preparations for a new action.
As we know from the English accounts, the Lion was
not able to reach harbour under her own steam but was taken in tow by the
Indomitable during the afternoon, and towed to the Firth of Forth. The
question as to whether our flotillas that stood by the cruisers could have kept
in touch with the enemy so as to attack at night must be negatived, as they
would not have had sufficient fuel. As regards the flotillas assembled in the
Jade, when the news of the encounter reached them the enemy was already so far
ahead as to exclude the prospect of a successful night attack.
This first serious fight with large ships which the Fleet
had had the opportunity of participating in proved that the fighting
preparedness of the ships as regards the training of all on board was on a very
high level, that the ships were handled in a correct and reliable manner, and
that the serving of the guns, the signalling, and the transmission of orders
from ship to ship during the fight, as well as the measures necessitated by
leakages, had all worked admirably. Everywhere the behaviour of the crews was
exemplary. The case of the Seydlitz (Captain von Egidy), from which
ship, in spite of the fierce fire raging on board, the command of the whole
unit was calmly maintained, deserves special emphasis.
¹ The English commander, Admiral Beatty, boasted in his
report that his ships had achieved a speed of 28.5 knots.
²According to an English account, the Lion, Tiger,
Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable.
³Admiral Beatty says in his report: "I followed the
squadron with the utmost speed on the destroyer Attack, and met them at noon as
they withdrew to the north-north-west. I went on board the Princess
Royal and hoisted my flag at 12.20 P.M., when Captain Brock informed me of
what had happened after theLion fell out, how the Blücher
was sunk, and the enemy battle-cruisers very much damaged had continued their
eastward course." His report does not mention any reason for their not having
pursued the damaged German cruisers.
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