THE affair of August 28, 1914, could be regarded as the
preliminary of some enterprise on a larger scale, an enterprise in which our
Fleet would start at a disadvantage if the enemy held the initiative. He would
thus be able to make full use of his superiority while we had to undertake the
difficult deployment from the estuaries of our rivers. By choosing his own
moment the attacker had the advantage of previously sending out his submarines
in large numbers to suitable stations. As the result of their frequent visits
to the Heligoland Bight, as well as their experiences in the August action,
they must have acquired sufficient data to be employed effectively.
The defensive attitude imposed on our Fleet was a direct
help to such a plan. To anticipate it it was therefore obvious that our High
Command would desire greater freedom of movement in order to have a chance of
locating parts of the enemy's forces. This could only be done if the light
forces sent out ahead could count on timely intervention by the whole High Sea
Fleet. On the other hand, it was not the Fleet's intention to seek battle with
the English Fleet off the enemy's coasts. The relative strength (as appeared
from a comparison of the two battle lines) made chances of success much too
improbable. Taking battleships only, the superiority on the English side was
seven compared with our total number of battleships, thirteen, and therefore
more than fifty per cent. Our older ships of Squadron II, which dated from the
pre-Dreadnought period, would be opposed to an English squadron composed of
ships of the "King Edward VII " class of equal fighting value..
The Supreme Command attached more importance to the security
of the sea front, which was entrusted to the Fleet, in this early period of the
war than to the damage which it might possibly be able to inflict on the
enemy's fleet. The restrictions imposed on the Battle Fleet were therefore
adhered to.
The attempts to damage the enemy by guerilla operations were
continued, and in addition cruiser raids against the English coast and the
Skagerrak were planned. The U-boats carried their operations ever farther
afield, and at last they had their first success on September 8, when "U 2 l "
(Hersing) sank the light cruiser Pathfinder at the entrance to the Firth
of Forth. This was followed by the great feat of Weddigen when, with " U 9," on
September 22, he made a bag of the three armoured cruisersCressy,
Aboukir and Hogue, twenty nautical miles N.W. of the Hook of
Holland.
Weddigen's name was in everyone's mouth, and for the Navy in
particular his achievement meant a release from the oppressive feeling of
having done so little in this war in comparison with the heroic deeds of the
army. But no such victory had been required to reveal completely the value of
the submarine for our war-like operations, especially after it had given such
unexpectedly convincing proof of its ability to remain at sea.
Favourable news came from abroad also. The Emden had
begun her successful operations against English merchant ships in the Gulf of
Bengal, and in East Africa the light cruiser Königsberg had sunk
the Pegasus and so avenged the bombardment of Dares-Salaam.
About the middle of September the squadron of older ships
which had been newly-formed at the beginning of the war had so far progressed
in its training that it could be commissioned for service in the North Sea. The
ships were not themselves fit to take part in a Fleet action, but they could
take over part of the duties of patrolling the estuaries and keeping these open
against attempts at interruption when the Fleet was at sea. However, they were
never employed on this service, for they were not kept long in commission, as
their ships' companies were needed urgently elsewhere later on. However, the
work spent on them had not been wasted, for they gave the Fleet well-trained
men for its new ships, and their presence in the Baltic in the first weeks of
the war had the effect of giving our Baltic forces much greater importance in
the eyes of the Russians than was justified by the facts. This, and possibly,
too, their lack of confidence in their own efficiency, may be responsible for
the fact that the Russians refrained from taking the offensive.
On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief had immediately
taken the offensive himself, although all he could promise himself for a result
was the intimidation of the Russian naval forces in the Baltic. In spite of the
fact that at the outset he had only two light cruisers, Augsburg and
Magdeburg, a few torpedo-boats and some steamers, converted into
mine-layers, at his disposal, he did not wait for the Russians to attack, but,
immediately after the declaration of war, put to sea and bombarded Libau. The
bombardment did not do much damage, it is true, but it compelled the Russians
to take a hand in the work of demolition. Moreover, mines were laid at the
entrance of the Gulf of Finland.
Our purpose was completely attained and compensated for the
loss of the light cruiser Magdeburg, which ran ashore in a haze on
August 27 and had to be abandoned. On October 11 the armoured cruiser
Pallada, which had distinguished itself by shooting at the
Magdeburg when she was stuck fast, fell a victim to our " U 26 "
(Freherr von Berckheim). This success did not fail to have a paralysing effect
on Russian enterprise.
Without going further into the details of the operations in
the Baltic their effect on the general situation at home can be described as
extremely important. Without depriving the Fleet of important forces and
thereby weakening or quite paralysing it, the modest forces employed kept the
Russians in check, so that there was no bombardment of the German coast from
the sea, and traffic in the Baltic, which was absolutely vital for war
purposes, was not interfered with. The observation and security of the southern
exit of the Belt and Sound made it possible for us to use the western basin of
the Baltic for the Fleet's battle practices. Without such a training area the
exercising of the new units which had been formed at the beginning of the war
would have been very difficult. In the same way it would have been very
doubtful whether we could have carried out trial trips and the first gunnery
tests of newly commissioned ships.
As the war proceeded the importance of the western Baltic as
an aid to keeping the Fleet ready to strike became a matter of life and death.
Without constant training of an appropriate kind the standard of gunnery and
navigation would have sunk to a precarious level. When navigating on a raid in
the North Sea the attention of the Flag Officers was fully taken up with the
possibility of enemy counter-measures and more especially with defence against
underwater attack. Half the ship's company were on watch at action stations and
the engine-room complement were on watch down below, and as their duties
required their whole attention it was no good thinking of carrying out useful
exercises of the whole ship's company under the direction of the commander. We
could only expect victory in battle if we succeeded in maintaining that
standard of training in which we saw our sole and overwhelming chance of
beating the enemy. A suitable practice area for this purpose was the Baltic,
with Kiel Haven as base. Without this area at our disposal the development
which our submarine weapon subsequently underwent would have been quite
unthinkable.
In view of the importance of this practice area for our
operations and the valuable establishments at Kiel dockyards, especially the
torpedo-establishments at Friedrichsort, on the efficiency of which the whole
submarine war was later to depend, it appears incredible that the enemy made no
efforts to open this vital vein. At the beginning of the war the mining by the
Danes of the northern and central portions of the Great Belt was in accordance
with the wishes of our Naval Staff that the safety of the Baltic should be
secured. There may be some question as to whether the Danes had the right to
mine these waters, for they were an international strait, but the mining was
approved by the English also, apparently because it fitted in with their plan
of not penetrating into the Baltic. Our Fleet regarded these mines as a great
obstacle to their freedom of movement, for they deprived it of the possibility,
when large ships were sent out on a distant raid in the North Sea, of bringing
them back round the Skagen into the Baltic instead of keeping them on the
single line of retirement to Heligoland. For political reasons the Naval Staff
regarded it as unwise to demand the opening of the Great Belt by Denmark.
Of the different mine-laying enterprises of the High Sea
Fleet in the autumn months of 1914 a special mention is due to a cruise which
on October 17 began at the mouth of the Ems and had the south coast of England
for its goal. Four ships of the 7th Half-Flotilla (Commander Thiele) "S " 115,
116, 117, 119 were employed. These older boats had been chosen with an eye to
the possibilities of casualties, because the' were no longer fit for other
duties. The ships' companies had all volunteered for this dangerous raid. Their
task consisted of laying mines at the entrance to the Downs, the Channel
leading round the S.E. corner of England from Dover to the mouth of the Thames.
The English Admiralty had announced that navigation of the area between Lat.
51° 15' N. and 51° 41' and Long. 1° 35' E. and 3° 0' E. (that
means a strip 35 nautical miles broad from the English to the Dutch coast) was
dangerous on account of mines. For this reason traffic was compelled to use the
open channel close to the land. It was thus under English control, and the
English found their inspection service easier. By mining the channel leading
into the Thames we might expect practically a stoppage of London's supplies.
England's behaviour in laying mines in the open sea, a
policy made public in this announcement, released us from the necessity of
observing the limits we had hitherto imposed on ourselves of restricting
mine-laying solely to the enemy's coasts, an operation which was naturally
attended with greater danger to the minelayer the nearer she approached within
reach of the coastal patrol forces.
The half-flotilla had left the Ems in the early hours of the
morning when it was still dark. Near Haaks Lightship, 15 miles W. of the
southern point of the Island of Texel, it met the English cruiser
Undaunted and four destroyers of the latest type, escape from which was
impossible. As this was realised our ships attacked and, after a brave defence
in an action which was carried on at a range of a few hundred yards, were sunk.
The English saved as many of the survivors as was possible. After we received
the first wireless message that action had begun, no further news of the
torpedo-boats was forthcoming, and as we had therefore to assume that they had
been lost, we sent out the hospital ship Ophelia to pick up any
survivors. However, the English captured her and made her prize, charging us
with having sent her out for scouting purposes, although she was obviously
fitted up as a hospital ship and bore all the requisite markings.
The auxiliary cruiser Berlin was sent out into the
North Sea the same night. Her commission was to lay mines off the most
northerly point of Scotland, as we had reason to suspect a lively movement of
warships there. The cruise of the Berlin was favoured by better luck,
for it was one of her mines to which the battleship Audacious fell a
victim about a week later. She was so damaged that she had to be abandoned in a
sinking condition. The English succeeded in keeping secret for a considerable
time the loss of this great battleship, a loss which was a substantial success
for our efforts at equalisation. When the news leaked out at last its truth was
definitely and decisively denied.
The following points deserve to be remembered in considering
these two enterprises: (1) Mine-laying in the open seas. (2) The capture of a
hospital ship which was engaged in the work of saving life from the best of
,motives and observing all the regulations. (3) The suppression of the news
that an important ship had been lost in the case of the Audacious.
The behaviour of the English was inspired at all points by
consideration for what would serve their military purposes, and was not
troubled by respect for international agreements. But this did not prevent
England from raising loud cries later on when we also considered ourselves
released from our obligation and with far more justification took action
against hospital ships which, under cover of the Red Cross Flag, were patently
used for the transport of troops. In the case of the Audacious we can
but approve the English attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy,
because accurate information about the other side's strength has a decisive
effect on the decisions taken.
The complete loss of the 7th Half-Flotilla was very painful,
and the Commander-in-Chief has been freely criticised for having sent it out
insufficiently supported. The reply to that is that it is extremely difficult
to decide what "sufficient support " is. Suppose, in relation to the case under
consideration, we say in the light of after events that if we had had two more
cruisers we should have had a superiority, such a method of reasoning involves
a knowledge beforehand of the strength of the enemy; otherwise you might have
to bring up your whole fleet at every alarm if you wished to feel perfectly
safe. Besides, risk is of the very essence of war. The idea is implied even in
Moltke's phrase, "Think first." On the other hand, our failure revealed the
importance to our operations of the base on the Flemish coast, from which
enterprises of this kind were much more feasible and indeed led to a permanent
threat to the English trade route in the Channel.
In October the enemy submarines outside the Ems and in the
Heligoland Bight were very active. There was hardly a day on which reports were
not received that enemy submarines had been sighted. Although a good many of
these turned out to be false alarms, their presence was frequently confirmed by
the fact that torpedoes were fired. Apart from the loss of the Hela on
September 13, which has already been mentioned, the torpedo-boat " G 116 " was
sunk by a torpedo north of Schiermonnikoog on October 6. It was possible to
save most of the men. On the other hand, the torpedo-boat "G7" and an incoming
auxiliary cruiser which were attacked in the neighbourhood of Amrum had better
luck, as all the torpedoes fired at them missed.
The annoyance from submarines increased our determination to
master them. In October, after the English "E 3 " had fallen a victim to one of
our U-boats, which had been lying in wait all day for this exceptionally
well-handled ship, and several other English submarines had had unpleasant
experiences with our mines in the neighbourhood of Heligoland, the area of the
Bight inside Heligoland was given a wider berth. Beyond the island, however, we
had perpetually to deal with the watchful activities of English submarines.
Moreover, during the autumn storms the neighbourhood of the coasts was
particularly unfavourable for navigation. Our own submarine cruises extended
farther and farther afield as the commanders continued to gain experience, and
by exchanging notes these operations became increasingly effective.
On October 15 "U 16" passed Heligoland after a cruise of
fifteen days, and on her return reported that she was still perfectly
effective. This month also witnessed the first cruise round the British
Islands. " U 20 " (Lieutenant-Commander Droescher), which had been sent out
against transports in the English Channel, found itself compelled, by damage to
the diving apparatus, to avoid the Channel, which was closely patrolled, and
therefore returned round Ireland and Scotland. The cruise took eighteen days in
all.
On November 1 the English cruiser Hermes was sunk off
Dunkirk by the U-boats which were commissioned to hinder the transport of
English troops to the French ports. Unfortunately no success in this particular
direction was achieved.
To assign this task of interrupting the English troopship
service to the Fleet was to make a totally impossible demand, as the losses it
would inevitably involve would be out of all proportion to the advantage the
army would derive from the disturbance to the transport of English troops such
a Fleet action might cause. Even if the presence of our Fleet in these waters
held up one or more ships, the way would be open the minute our Fleet left, and
nothing could be easier than to arrange for ships to put out as soon as news
was received that the enemy had gone. However important a factor in the war on
land England's effort might be, the best way of neutralising it would have been
the occupation of the French Channel coast.
If our Fleet went into the English Channel by the
Dover-Calais Straits its tactical situation would be simply hopeless. It would
have no room to manuvre against torpedo and mine attack. Our own
destroyers would not have enough fuel, as their radius of action only just
reached as far, and they would then find themselves compelled to return. The
Fleet would then have had to do without them or return with them. There could
be no question of the former alternative on account of the danger from
submarines, defence against which was the work of the destroyers, and also
because the destroyers were indispensable for battle. The Fleet was therefore
dependent upon the radius of action of the destroyers. The appearance of the
submarine as a defensive weapon has made it a necessity in modern times to
screen the approach of a fleet with destroyers. Moreover, it is so important to
increase the offensive powers of a fleet which is inferior in numbers by the
employment of destroyers that these cannot possibly be dispensed with. If one
compares, simply on a map, the position of a fleet which ventures into the
Channel from the Heligoland Bight with that of a fleet making for the
Heligoland Bight from the English coastfrom the Firth of Forth, for
examplethe advantages and disadvantages of the prospects on either side
are at once apparent. One fleet is placed as if it were corked in a bottle,
while the other has freedom of movement over the whole area in its rear.
At the end of October Squadron II had visited Kiel dockyard
to effect certain important improvements in armament and the comfort of the
ships, which had suffered very much from the removal of everything which was
likely to catch fire. This was in the interests of the health of the ships'
companies during the winter. The compartments throughout the ship were
insulated in the same way as those in the newer ships by the use of fireproof
material. Living in ships in which every noise came as a shock from one end to
the other became a severe trial to the nerves as time went by, and in view of
the strenuous hours on watch, was prejudicial to the short period allowed for
rest. The victims will never forget those weeks of the war in which the tapping
of hammers and the scraping of chisels never ceased from first thing in the
morning to last thing at night, and mountains of wood and superfluous paint
vanished from the ship.
This first visit of a squadron to the Baltic was also to be
employed in various exercises in which cruisers and destroyers were to
participate. It appeared advisable, in view of this, to take advantage of the
presence of the ships for a great enterprise against Libau which might be very
unpleasant as a winter base for enemy submarines, as it was the only Russian
ice-free harbour. While the orders for this enterprise were being settled with
the Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic and everyone was burning for the chance of
at last firing his first shot, the news reached us from the North Sea that the
bombardment of English coast towns had successfully been carried out on
November 3. Early that morning our battle-cruisers had appeared off Yarmouth to
bombard the harbour and its fortifications while mines were being laid under
their protection. The absence of Squadron II had not restrained the
Commander-in-Chief from taking advantage of the favourable weather and long
nights for this raid, from which we could anticipate an effect on the defensive
attitude of the enemy as well as the direct influence which the damage to a
hostile base would have on the enemy's operations. It was not found necessary
to send the Fleet out to take up an advanced station at sea in the case of the
short raid to Yarmouth, because the plan was to be based entirely on surprise
under cover of darkness. After returning from this raid the old armoured
cruiser Yorck ran on a mine in a mist in the Jade and was capsized by
the explosion. It was found possible to save the larger part of the crew.
The raid against Libau was cancelled at the last moment as
the result of an order from the Naval Staff to Squadron II, which was already
on its way. The frequent reports of the activity of English submarines in the
Baltic, which had come in of late, seemed to point to the wisdom of abandoning
the enterprise, as the bombardment by ships of land targets would certainly
offer submarines their very best chances of attack. The submarine danger was
taken very seriously because we had not yet had sufficient experience and
training in the defence.
On November 6 we received the news of the victory of our
cruiser squadron on November 1 off Coronel on the coast of Chile. Vice-Admiral
Count von Spee had defeated in fair and open fight the English cruisers Good
Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow and the auxiliary cruiser Otranto with his
ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the light cruisers
Leipzig and Dresden. The two hostile armoured cruisers were
destroyed by a superior fire, while Glasgow and Otranto escaped
under cover of falling night. Great was the enthusiasm over the fact that the
brave admiral had succeeded, in spite of all obstacles, in leading his ships to
a victory which dealt a severe blow to the tradition of English superiority at
sea. This news filled us in the Fleet with pride and confidence, and we thought
in gratitude of those who, left to their resources in distant oceans, had
gained immortal laurels for the German flag. Unfortunately fate was not to
permit them to see their homeland again. Those who, with their leaders, rest in
the ocean depths by the Falkland Islands, gave us a shining example of heroism,
of devotion to duty.
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