by James Burbeck
In Oahu, Hawaii, early on the
morning of December 7, 1941, the War in the Pacific was already over an hour
old. Nobody in Hawaii knew it yet, just like nobody yet knew that several
flights of Japanese warplanes were already in the air and headed toward the
island. The approaching Japanese aircraft were launched from Japan's six
biggest and best aircraft carriers – part of a small task force that had
brazenly steamed to within 200 miles of the American held Hawaiian Islands in
order to execute a key part of the Imperial Japanese government's war
plan.
The Pearl Harbor attack plan had two immediate goals; the
destruction of American aircraft carriers known to frequent the area, and the
sinking of as many other capital ships as possible, especially battleships.
With these two tasks complete, the Japanese hoped to neutralize the American
fleet's ability to project air and sea power in the Pacific Basin for at least
six months. During that time they planned to occupy the East Asian and West
Pacific regions with such firmness that the Allies would be forced to negotiate
a settlement. In pursuit of these attack goals, Japanese naval officers created
a detailed plan which took advantage of known factors such as the American
Navy's habit of returning to its main anchorage at Pearl Harbor every weekend.
Equally detailed alternate plans included options for attacking the American
fleet's deep sea anchorage at Lahaina Roads, or hunting down U.S. fleet units
in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. This later plan was the worst case
scenario for them, because it would require their carrier fleet to fight its
way into the attack zone. They were however, prepared to do this if necessary
and only if discovered before "X-Day" did they have any intention of
withdrawing without a fight.
The core planning for the attack was
conducted by Commanders Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda, both of whom belonged
to Japan's elite of bright young naval aviators who were sure that the future
of naval warfare would be decided by aviation. As in other navies of the time,
these officers faced resistance by older leaders who disliked change, and who
thought that battleships still represented the pinnacle of naval power. This
was ultimately revealed in the final attack plans, which included both American
aircraft carriers and battleships as primary targets. The plan envisioned
passage of a six-carrier task force through the "vast empty sea" which lay
between Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands. Once north of Hawaii, a scouting
mission of two float planes was to be launched in order to ascertain the
presence of American fleet units at Pearl Harbor, Lahaina Roads and in the
waters immediately around Oahu. Their final reports were to be forwarded to the
Japanese air fleet which by then would be nearing its final deployment point.
Precise timing was required in order to guarantee that the attacking air fleet
would know what vessels to expect and where to expect them. Fuchida actually
hoped to be able to strike the US Fleet at the Lahaina anchorage, where deep
water would prevent salvage of sunken ships. He and Genda had formulated
detailed attack plans in case such an opportunity arose. However, because their
targets would most likely be in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor, the
Japanese high level bombers were slated to carry specially converted 16-inch
naval shells capable of penetrating the armored deck of the heaviest American
battleships. It was hoped that these heavy shells would detonate the powder
magazines of their heavily armored targets, thereby causing such colossal
damage as to make salvage impossible. Modifications were also made to the
Japanese aerial torpedoes in order to allow their launching in very shallow
waters. Nothing they could consider was left to chance. They were prepared for
any eventuality. Such detailed preparations helped to counter the heavy weight
of uncertainty which hung over the entire operation. Every senior Japanese
officer knew that if the American Fleet were to avoid contact until they were
discovered, the tables could unpredictably turn against them.
The War Warning
As
received at Pearl Harbor headquarters over a week before the attack.
Another more explicit warning arrived four days before the attack:
"November 27, 1941 - This despatch is to be considered a war warning.
Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next
few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
the naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.
Inform district and army authorities."
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As the days passed and war appeared inevitable –
as indeed it was under the circumstances – the American government
continued its preparations while struggling to avoid conflict. When political
negotiations broke down, war warnings were sent to all major American commands
in the Pacific, including both Navy and Army commands in Hawaii. From the
American perspective, the main military threat remained in the southwestern
Pacific where over 200 Japanese naval vessels were deploying in an ominous
pre-amble to war. This served as a perfect camouflage for Vice-Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo's strike fleet already headed for Hawaii. On board this fleet, Fuchida
and Genda constantly sought to raise Nagumo's morale by emphasizing the need
for multiple attacks against the American military bases. Nagumo, who thought
the "Hawaiian Operation" a dangerous gamble, insisted that he would follow the
letter of his orders. These orders required a single heavy attack in two waves
followed by an immediate withdrawal. His conviction that they would probably be
discovered ahead of time by the Americans was a notable contrast to the real
picture, in which the Americans remained not only unaware of his approach, but
barely considered it a possibility.
Probably the closest that anyone
came to considering an attack against Oahu was Admiral Husband Kimmel. On
November 27, a large meeting took place in which Kimmel and his staff met with
Lt. General Walter Short, the senior US Army commander in Hawaii. During the
meeting, the army's plan to assume command of the defense of Wake and Midway
islands was viewed with concern by Lt. Colonel James Mollison, primarily
because such a defense would drain valuable aircraft away from Oahu. To this
Kimmel responded "Why are you so worried about this? Do you think we are in
danger of attack?"
To which Mollison replied "The Japanese have such a
capability."
"Capability, yes, but possibility?" asked Kimmel. Immediately
he asked the fleet war plans officer, Captain Charles McMorris, "What do you
think about the prospects of a Japanese air attack?"
McMorris replied
"None, absolutely none."
Still, Kimmel may not have been completely
convinced. He turned down the prospective move of half the island's army
aircraft, keeping them on Oahu just in case.
| A typical American battleship of the 1930s. This is
Arizona shortly after her 1930 refit. |
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Very little action was taken to further counter this
tantalizing prospect, even several days later when Japanese fleet carriers
remained unaccounted for in Navy intelligence reports. Unfortunately the
Intelligence bureaus were struggling with a recently changed set of Imperial
Navy call signs while also trying to track the naval buildup in the south and
attempting to relocate Japan's two primary carrier groups. Because those same
carrier groups had been unaccounted for 12 times since the middle of the year,
the most recent blind period failed to cause alarm. In any case, by November 25
everybody knew there was going to be war, it was just a matter of where. And in
the opinion of the American naval command in Hawaii, the "where" was the
Philippines, Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. They considered Pearl
Harbor's task being to train and prepare men for combat in the western Pacific,
not to spread alarm and bring the entire training and ferry service to a halt
(B-17 bombers being ferried to Philippine command traveled through Hawaii).
Whether this was truly justified in the world before December 7 will probably
never be known. For the reality was that by December 1, Nagumo and his six
large fleet carriers were carrying the cream-of-the-crop of Japanese naval
aviation toward a launch point 200 miles north of Oahu, Hawaii. And once
launched, they would not turn back until they had struck the heavy blow for
which they had meticulously trained.
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