The duke of Tarentum was by no means
disposed to remain for any length of time in this troublesome position, and
with the brave troops that he commanded, he could cut his way in any direction
that it was required to direct his operations. The government had instructed
him to advance on Tarragona, in order to assist in the siege of Tortosa; but as
he himself was not in a condition to besiege the first of these two places, he
adopted the resolution of marching to Lerida, in order to communicate with the
army of Arragon, and to concert measures with its commander. On the 25th of
August, accordingly, he set out with his whole force, which was previously
assembled. His advanced-guard took in the first instance the route of the Col
de Balaguer, but afterwards changed the direction of its march for the defile
of Ribas and Monblanch, where the French and the Italian infantry had a most
brilliant affair; the army arrived before Lerida on the 29th of August. General
Suchet was informed of this movement by the aid-de-camp of the marshal, and
left Mora on the 23rd, passed through Mequinenza, and arrived at Lerida before
the duke of Tarentum, in order to receive him at that city. The two generals
had no difficulty in agreeing as to what was advisable, and what was
practicable in the state of affairs. Before considering those more distant
operations, contemplated by the government, it was absolutely necessary to
occupy Tarragona and Tortosa, agreeably to the instructions of the prince of
Neufchatel himself. Prudence, however, demanded that they should begin by the
siege of Tortosa, and that they should mutually aid each other in that
operation. General Suchet found himself quite capable of undertaking it with
his own forces, provided he were supported, and Marshal Macdonald in a
condition to protect the operations of the siege, if he were furnished with
provisions, of which he stood much in want. It was arranged, therefore, that
the former should hasten the arrival of his artillery before the fortress ; and
that the latter should occupy Lerida, in order to collect the produce of the
harvest and form magazines. General Suchet gave up to the marshal the amount of
the requisitions for provisions agreed to by the communes of the plain of Seu
d'Urgel, which is looked on as the granary of Catalonia. He did more ; be
placed at his disposal 10,000 quintals of wheat, the stores of the 3rd
division, which had been collected with great labour at Monzon and at
Barbastro. By this distribution, which necessity demanded, he deprived himself
of all the stores he might otherwise have procured from Mequinenza and the left
bank, and limited his supplies to the remainder of Arragon. The environs of
Tortosa offered nothing of the kind for his use ; the division of Laval bad
consumed the whole crop of the left bank, after having got it cut down and
thrashed out, and the left bank presented nothing but arid mountains and
marshes. The army was in consequence compelled to draw its substance from
Saragossa, Teruel, and a number of points in Arragon, at a distance from
Tortosa of more than sixty leagues. The difficulty of getting transports very
much enhanced the difficulty of provisioning the troops, for at Mequinenza
there were but a very small number of barks, which had been collected for the
use of the artillery. This service, which was become one of the highest
importance, was attended with numerous difficulties, arising out of the season
of the year and. circumstances which were well calculated to render the general
uneasy.
The waters of the Ebro are generally low during the summer, and
the enormous cargoes that we had to transport to Tortosa, might, it was
foreseen, be detained for a long time on the voyage, or in the port where they
then lay. Moreover, the march and the stay of the army of Catalonia, in the
neighbourhood of Lerida, as they again left the Spanish army at liberty to
manoeuvre between Tarragona, Monblanch, and Tortosa, made the navigation of the
river extremely perilous. Previous to his quitting marshal Macdonald, who
departed early in September, first for Agramont, and then for Cervera, general
Suchet took advantage of a moment of security and of a rise of the stream, to
despatch the first convoy of artillery from Mequinenza, under the protection of
a Neapolitan division of 2,500 men whom the marshal placed for the time under
his orders. This corps was composed of a set of fine fellows, but they were
badly armed, worse clothed, and had been spoiled, in consequence of
incorporating with them most imprudently, a mixture of vagabonds and of persons
who had been condemned, or who had been punished as criminals. The discipline
of the division felt the effect of this, and the example which was displayed of
pillage and of desertion at times, was most fatal, although the valour of the
great mass of the men, and the excellent conduct of the officers, frequently
redeemed all their faults. The marshal proposed to the general to dove-tail, as
it were, this division, which was commanded by prince Pignatelli, into the main
body of his army, and to endeavour to derive some advantage from them, by
giving them a stationary position, which is more calculated for supervision,
and for the maintenance of order, than marching and countermarching are. The
division sometimes, displayed the good effect of the pains employed in its
behalf, but without entirely losing those vices which were inherent in its
constitution. By marching from Lerida down the banks of the Ebro, by way of
Llardican, they ensured the safe passage of a convoy of twenty-six breaching
cannons of large calibre, which arrived by water at Mora, and were transported
thence to Xerta, on the 5th September and there parked. The Neapolitan division
was afterwards established at Garcia. On the 3rd the commander-in-chief retired
to his head quarters at Mora. General Habert once more took up his old station
at Tivisa, and Mas de Mora continued to be occupied by the reserve. As soon as
the army of Catalonia had retired from Reuss, the Spaniards again established
themselves in force at Falset.
General Laval who had been ill for
nearly twenty days, died on the 16th September ; he was deeply regretted by the
army and left behind him a reputation of courage, and probity, which did honour
to his memory. His division, during his absence had been confided to the brave
general Harispe, an experienced campaigner, who knew well, not only how to lead
his men, but, by the force of his authority and of his example, to make them
follow him. The commander-in-chief was of opinion that he could not commit into
more steady hands the command of Laval's division and the charge of the
blockade of Tortosa; he accordingly requested, and obtained for that officer
the rank of general of division, which he well merited by his services and his
wounds. General Harispe was replaced in the duties of chief of the army-staff,
by the adjutant commandant St. Cyr Nugues, who had filled the office of
sub-chief, from the month of May, 1809. He had been formerly an aid-de-camp,
the friend and companion in arms of the commander-in-chief, who entertained a
real affection for him, and entirely confided in him. Rights so acquired to
confidence and esteem, are perhaps with a general, who has charge of an army,
the chief merit of the person whom he selects to be his second, before whom,
and with whom, be meditates his plans and prepares his operations, and on whom
he reposes for ordering their execution when he has matured them for that
purpose by counsel and meditation.
As the Valencians whose army had not
been .subdued, were continually watching an opportunity for advancing to
disturb the blockade, count Suchet determined to leave a portion of the brigade
of Montmarie, in conjunction with the troops commanded by general Boussard at
Ulldecona, and placed this army of observation under the command of the general
of division, Musnier, whose place at Saragossa he directed to be occupied by
general Paris; general Verges came to Mas de Mora. Colonel Kliski, with whose
activity the commander-in-chief was well acquainted, received the command of
the detached corps that covered the right bank of the Ebro, alternately at
Teruel, Montalvan, Daroca and Calatayud, to defend that portion of Arragon from
the incursions of Villacampa. That indefatigable partizan was watching, on the
frontiers of Castille, for an opportunity of disturbing the operations of the
army of Arragon. He kept up a constant correspondence in Saragossa, which
compelled the commander-in-chief to take measures of precaution, and
occasionally to employ both severity and menaces. He obstructed wherever his
influence extended, the supply of provisions to the French, and especially the
requisitions of cattle necessary for the subsistence of the troops assembled on
the banks of the Ebro. On the 7th of August at Las Cuevas, colonel Plicque, who
was bringing 6,000 sheep with a detachment of the 114th regiment and of the
14th hussars, was surrounded and attacked by nearly four thousand men. He
maintained an obstinate fight, in which he lost three officers and a number of
soldiers, and only got back to Alcaniz by leaving his convoy behind him. The
following evening captain Cantiloube, a brave officer, who commanded a
detachment that was conducting some cattle, was surrounded and taken at
Andorra, on the side of Montalvan. About the same time the Guerillas of
Navarre, under the direction of general Reilly, who had just assumed the
command in that quarter, penetrated into Cinco Villas, where they surprised and
killed the war-commissary, Gondoin, who with a detachment of gendarmes, was
occupied in collecting provisions. These several losses affected us very
sensibly. The army of Arragon, which had been master of a fertile province,
above all things in wheat and wine, had yielded to an auxiliary corps the whole
of its magazines. It could neither send out to seek for provisions, nor bring
them safely in when obtained; it was, in consequence, in imminent hazard of
wanting food altogether, was reduced to drink water for want of boats to bring
wine, and had, in fact, nothing on which it could safely reckon but its rations
of bread, which were procured with great difficulty, and by efforts that were
constantly to be repeated Chief commissary Bondurand, who had, for a long time,
been attached to Suchet's division in the grand army, at length arrived, and
took charge of the administration of the 3rd corps. His probity and
intelligence were known to the commander-in-chief, who bad requested his
services as head commissary, and who had afterwards the highest reason to
congratulate himself on having obtained them. By thus surrounding himself with
men who merited his confidence, and whose only aim was to justify his good
opinion, he obtained advantages which his position, very frequently, did not
entitle him to expect. The privations endured by the army were rare, and Dever
arose out of imprudence or disorder, and when they were inevitable, the
devotedness of the men, rendered them light, from the courage and patience with
which they were borne.
General Suchet had soon an opportunity which he
eagerly seized of repairing the injury inflicted by Villcampa, in carrying off
his sheep. That partizan, in the month of September, advanced towards Montalvan
with his troops, which were greatly augmented by recruits and armed peasants,
and threatened to disturb the tranquillity of a part of Arragon. In the hope of
getting up with, and defeating him, general Habert was detached front the camp
before Mora, with the 5th regiment of light infantry.
By a rapid
movement, he rallied round him the troops which colonel Plicque had at
Alcanhiz, and those of Kliski at Muniessa, and marching straight upon
Villacampa, the latter was compelled to disperse, and to re-cross the frontiers
of Cuenca and Valencia. A general search that took place, in consequence of
this event, gave us back the sheep we had lost, and furnished the army with the
provisions they so much required.
The only thing that especially
pressed on the attention of the commander-in-chief after this success, was, the
transport of the artillery that had been used in the siege of Mequinenza, and
that was now to be employed in that of Tortosa. At the former place every thing
was ready : guns, ammunition, gabions, fascines, and every other requisite. An
attempt was made to float another convoy of artillery, but the water was so low
that it was found impossible, and the commander-in-chief determined to begin
the transport of the guns by land. The new road, though exceedingly well made,
traversed rugged hills and a desert uninhabited country, which presented no
resources for the purpose ; a single convoy by water would have brought down
more in three days than 15 or 1800 horses could in a month. But perseverance
consists in always advancing towards its object speedily if possible, but if
not at least steadily though slowly. Several convoys of guns were brought by
land; some of the Valencians and Catalonians attacked one that was passing
through the defile of Las Armas on the 29th; but captain Claudot of the l7th
regiment, who commanded in that quarter, defended it with as much intelligence
as courage, and nothing was lost..
During the months of September and
October the army of Catalonia continued to occupy the plain of Urgel to
considerable purpose, but notwithstanding a large quantity of grain it afforded
them, they were not yet in a condition to approach the army of Arragon and to
co-operate with it, and our corps in consequence found themselves shut up in
the lower Ebro without the power of effecting any thing. The only chance of the
commander was in a rise of the waters and in the assistance that circumstances
might render him : his expectations were deceived. On the 28th of October
marshal Macdonald wrote to him: " The governor of Barcelona has announced to me
the approaching departure of a convoy from Perpignan between the 2nd and the
4th of November, and he presses me in the name of general d'Hilliers to favour
its advance. Were this convoy taken or dispersed, Barcelona might be lost, and
there can be no doubt that the enemy will try every means of intercepting it.
My presence alone can ensure its safety, and you are well aware that even were
the chances equal, we could not expose ourselves to this hazard which if it
happened to be against us would be without remedy." The preservation of
Barcelona was an object before which all others must of necessity yield. The
passage of a convoy by Figueras, Gerona, and Hostalrich, might have appeared to
be sufficiently assured by the body of troops which the duke of Tarentum bad
left in upper Catalonia, but that corps had recently met with a check at
Abisbal, which rendered it a matter of prudence not to leave it unsupported by
the efforts of O'Donnell's army on so important an occasion. O'Dorinell had by
a bold coup-de main just succeeded in cutting off general Schwartz and the men
he commanded on the sea coast between Palamos and the mouth of the Ter; in the
action he had received a severe wound which incapacitated him from acting, but
not from commanding, and the vigour and activity of his men seemed rather
increased than diminished by the accident. General Suchet who, with a view to
soften the rigours of war, never allowed an opportunity to escape him of
establishing honourable connexions with the generals of the enemy, sent a
messenger to request the exchange of a wounded officer who had been taken
prisoner, young Detchatz, lieu tenant of the 5th light infantry, and at the
same time to make an offer to general O'Donnell of a surgeon. The Spanish
commander did not accept it; but he expressed extreme gratitude on account of
it, and sent back the officer on his parole. |