| Our march on the lower Ebro.General
						view of Catalonia.The 3rd corps receives orders to besiege
						Tortosa.Opening of a road from Mequinenza to that city.Supplies
						drawn from Arragon.Military organization of the province during the
						siege. Head quarters established at Mora .Investment of the
						tete-de-pont at Tortosa.Sorties of the garrison. Movements of the
						Spaniards against the forces of the besiegers.The French army of
						Catalonia approaches the 3rd corps.Junction of the duke of Tarenturn with
						general Suchet at Lerida.First convoy by the Ebro.Death of general
						Laval.Partial actions.The army of Catalonia returns to
						Barcelona.ABOUT this period of the war in Spain, namely, in the
					 summer of 1810, the grand French army took possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and
					 Badajos, and penetrating into Portugal under the orders of marshal Massena,
					 advanced against the lines of Torres Vedras. The provinces of the north and of
					 the centre were occupied; the army of the interior held Andalusia from Grenada
					 to the walls of Cadiz. The Spanish regency, which was shut up in this last
					 asylum, not only defended them selves there with the greatest obstinacy but
					 cherished most carefully, through the medium of Carthagena and Alicante, the
					 spirited resistance the provinces in the east.
 
 No province in the
					 Peninsula, in a military point of view, is so well organized as Catalonia. The
					 number of strong places it contains is very great,-Roses, Figueras, Gerona,
					 Hostalrich, Seu d' Urgel, Cardona, Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, and in the
					 centre, Barcelona, the capital, whose dimensions and strength not undeservedly
					 allow it to rank among the first fortified towns in Europe. This vast province
					 presents such numerous obstacles both natural and artificial, that a French
					 army entering by Perpignan, unless it were numerous and abundantly provided,
					 can never make any efficient progress in it, either in the interior, or even on
					 the coast by the grand route, unless it be supported by a fleet, or by another
					 French corps d'armee operating on the lower Ebro. The 7th corps which was
					 commanded in the first instance by general Gouvion St. Cyr, and afterwards by
					 marshal Augereau, and which, at the period of which we are treating, had been
					 confided to marshal Macdonald, had little or no communication with our other
					 forces in the Peninsula. Its position in a mountainous tract and in the midst
					 of fortresses which it was impossible to take, or to keep when taken, but by
					 the assistance of magazines, compelled them to remain perpetually in sight of
					 France, for the purpose of drawing supplies from it. The sea meanwhile was shut
					 against them, and land convoys, which are ever so slow, so difficult, and so
					 insufficient, were necessarily to be resorted to for the provisioning of
					 Barcelona alone. Until that task was completed, the military operations of the
					 7th corps were limited to a very narrow circle, which was every day more and
					 more contracted by the attacks of the enemy. Whilst the junta of the Manresa
					 continued propagating insurrections throughout the whole of the province, the
					 Spanish army, commanded by Henry O'Donnell, manoeuvred with the utmost facility
					 at every point where it could hamper or interrupt our movements. O'Donnell was
					 advantageously posted at Tarragona, an ancient city where new defences had been
					 raised and old ones strengthened at a very great expence, and whose maritime
					 position gave it additional importance in a war which the English, by their
					 cooperation, cherished and maintained. Round Tarragona and at a short distance
					 from it, are several wealthy and industrious towns, such as Valls and Reuss;
					 the country, generally, is extremely fertile, well cultivated, and thickly
					 inhabited, and the whole of its produce was deposited in safety, and as a
					 resource in case of necessity in that city. Having his troops concentrated in
					 this spot, as in an intrenched camp, with a formidable redoubt to protect it,
					 O'Donnell could push forward his squadrons in any direction, as circumstances
					 required, towards Tortosa by the Col de Balaguer; towards Lerida, by Monblanch
					 by Villafranca and Montserrat, by Cardona, or Sen. d'Urgel; in a word, by the
					 centre or the extremities of the provinces, as he saw fit. If at any time the
					 7th corps succeeded in penetrating to the environs of Tarragona it was only
					 when combined and in force ; such approaches were merely temporary, and the
					 army in making them, carried along with it neither the means nor had they any
					 intention of undertaking a siege. O'Donnell in these cases, immediately divided
					 his forces and made his escape from our troops by retreating in various
					 directions, and in a short time the want of provisions compelled the French to
					 withdraw once more to the neighbourhood of Barcelona. The Spaniards, in that
					 case, were again left free to operate as they pleased; to seize or to avail
					 themselves of opportunities for attacking us where we happened to be weakly
					 defended or on disadvantageous ground; all which occasions they regularly
					 employed whenever they occurred, and. though our men, when they could grapple
					 with the enemy, maintained their wonted superiority in the fair field of
					 battle, yet, in the long run, this painful, tedious, and petty warfare,
					 accompanied with so many privations, was frequently attended with unfavourable
					 and mortifying results.
 
 
 On the 13th May, the same day on which
					 Lerida was assaulted, Hostalrich fell into the hands of the army of Catalonia.
					 The coincidence of dates and the distance between the two places prove that
					 marshal Augereau, so far from being able to carry on the siege of Lerida, had
					 not the means of co-operating in it, although in reality it was the business
					 not less of the 7th than of the 3rd corps. Lerida was the point d'appui of
					 Mequinenza; it is a strong and commanding position which, although lying
					 without the confines of Arragon, forms as it were a headland in that portion of
					 the Arragonese frontier, and by its influence may easily disturb a country that
					 has already submitted or is ready to do so. When general Suchet became master
					 of it he saw himself fully secured in the occupation of the province of which
					 he was governor, and in a condition to afford assistance to the provinces in
					 his neighbourhood. The government, however, did not, as was the case in
					 February, leave him for any length of time in doubt or ignorance of its
					 intentions On the 29th May the head of the imperial staff wrote to him in the
					 following terms: " The emperor supposes that you are now master of Mequinenza;
					 in that case you will take immediate measures for getting possession of Tortosa
					 also.
 
 The marshal duke of Tarentum will at the same time direct his
					 forces on Tarragona. Take care in the meanwhile to collect all your artillery
					 and to adopt every measure necessary for marching on Valencia and for storming
					 that city ; we must, however, in order to undertake that operation have Tortosa
					 and Tarragona in our power."
 
 When this mandate reached general Suchet,
					 he was already master not only of Mequinenza but of Morella, and consequently
					 in a condition to act as he was directed. His only fear, and that was
					 strengthened by his recent experience at Margalef, was, that he should not be
					 supported in so nice an operation as the siege of Tortosa ; the objection was
					 removed by a promise of assistance on the part of the army of Catalonia. The
					 sole object then contemplated by the general was to hasten the execution of his
					 orders, well persuaded that the capture of Tortosa was the first and most
					 important -result at which he could aim. This city, by its situation close to
					 the grand route and to the mouth of the Ebro, served not only as a point
					 d'appui. but as a connecting link with the Spanish forces of Valencia and
					 Catalonia. To isolate these forces was to weaken them; and in consequence they
					 combined most perseveringly in their efforts to prevent the fall of Tortosa; as
					 they were favoured by circumstances they succeeded in doing so or at least, for
					 a long time in retarding that event.
 
 As we have already stated, the
					 fertile plains of Urgel, which were subject to the influence of Lerida, offered
					 a resource against the wants of the 3rd corps; and one of the first cares of
					 the Commander- in -chief had been to levy requisitions there on the coming
					 crop, and thus to ensure a considerable store of provisions for the operations
					 to which he was destined. At the same time, general Vallee was instructed to
					 prepare a battering train, which was accordingly formed of a selection of our
					 own artillery, and of that which had been taken from the Spaniards, and when
					 assembled, it amounted to more than fifty pieces of cannon of different
					 calibres. Mequinenza was the principal entrepot for our ammunition and
					 provisions. Between that town and Tortosa there exists a communication by the
					 Ebro, but the course of that river is interrupted in numerous points by bars,
					 and these it is very often impossible to pass over, unless when the river is
					 accidently swollen by rains, or by the melting of the snows. The communications
					 by land are, yet more difficult in a country where the hills are so numerous
					 and become more and more precipitous, in proportion as you advance from Caspe
					 or Mequinenza towards Favares, Batea, Gandessa and Mora, and thence towards
					 Pinel Las Armas, Xerta and Tortosa. A road by which the operations of an army
					 could be conducted, had in consequence almost to be created; although there
					 existed some traces, or rather recollections, of that which had been formed, it
					 was said by the duke of Orleans in the war of the succession.
 
 On the 21
					 st June, general Paris, with a brigade of infantry, was sent forward in that
					 direction to occupy the principal points, and the villages, to disperse the
					 parties that infested the country, and at the same time to repulse the troops
					 of the line, who still kept the field in the neighbourhood of Tortosa. General
					 Rogniat despatched some officers of engineers and sappers after this brigade
					 with implements to trace and open a road: the infantry furnished daily from
					 1,000 to 1,200 men as labourers for that purpose.
 
 The soldiers who had
					 been accustomed to this sort of work, entered on it with great zeal, quiting
					 from time to time the pick-axe for the in musket, chasing the enemy and routing
					 them, and then returning cheerfully to their task. It was both a long and
					 tedious operation, to reestablish a road for great guns, which had been
					 abandoned for nearly 100 years, and that for a length of nearly twenty leagues
					 across precipitous mountains and deep vallies, and in some places entirely
					 destroyed by land slips or torrents from the mountains. The burning heat of
					 summer, added to the fatigue of the men ; they suffered severely from thirst,
					 and what was in no degree less tormenting, although those who do not know warm
					 climates by actual experience may not easily comprehend it, from the frightful
					 clouds of gnats which were generated in swarms by the stagnation of the air and
					 of the water in certain spots, and which pounced on the men, settled on various
					 parts of the body especially on their faces, and prevented them, in a great
					 degree, from acting, from seeing, or almost from breathing. Every precaution
					 that human prudence could suggest was adopted in order to avoid these
					 inconveniences, and in addition wine and vinegar were served out to the
					 soldiers, and their day's labour was paid in the same manner as if they had
					 been working in the trenches, so that over and above their rations, and their
					 ordinary pay, they had wherewith to procure, so far as money could, whatever
					 might be useful or agreeable to themselves in such a case.
 
 Arragon was
					 now the field for general Suchet's army. The civil authorities of this province
					 had been instructed beforehand to make provision for facilitating the distant
					 operations that were in contemplation; their physical resources, however, would
					 have been insufficient, had they not been backed by the good-will of the
					 people, which it was found necessary to conciliate. Brute force is, indeed,
					 limited in its application, and is of little avail ; and therefore, whenever it
					 is practicable, persuasion ought to be, made to take its place. The species of
					 anarchy, partly military, partly civil, which harassed Catalonia and Valencia,
					 joined to a pretty marked spirit of rivalry that exists in Spain between the
					 different provinces, rendered the Arragonese, by degrees, more and more
					 inclined to submit to, and even to confide in general Suchet. In order to bring
					 about this most desirable end, he designedly moderated the use of his
					 authority, by committing it to the hands of Spaniards, men whom he knew to be
					 most capable of exercising it with intelligence, and with equity. He supported
					 and encouraged their zeal, by his friendship, and noticed their useful services
					 both at Madrid and at Paris. Under these circumstances, he was able to reckon
					 when he removed to a distance from Arragon, upon all the resources which he had
					 been careful to husband there. He succeeded not only in forming magazines, but
					 what was far more difficult, in organizing means of transport. Alcaniz and
					 Caspe, as well as Mequinenza, became the stations for most important depots,
					 whence wheat, flour, oats, and biscuit, were regularly conveyed to the troops
					 by convoys of mules, with Spanish conductors, or by the bat horses attached to
					 the army. Saragossa, and all the rest of Arragon, poured in upon those points
					 the provisions necessary for the supply of our men.
 
 The
					 commander-in-chief confided the care of the province to general Musnier, with
					 whom he left general Buget, who was stationed at Huesca, in order to watch the
					 left bank of the Ebro, with twelve squadrons of foot gendarmes, and a couple of
					 battalions of infantry. General Verges was posted at Daroca with four
					 battalions, and 100 horse, and covered the, right bank, as well as occupied
					 Teruel and Calatayud. In addition to the forces that were left at Saragossa, as
					 well as the garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, Jaca, Monzon, and Venasque, a
					 connected series of fortified posts, or of strong barracks, had been
					 established along all the principal roads, which served at the same time as
					 lines of operation, and of communication. The object of these stations was to
					 ensure the safety of troops that had charge of the passage of couriers, and to
					 protect the posts of isolated and detached parties, as well as to see to the
					 furnishing of provisions, the collection of contributions.. and the due
					 obedience of the Corregidors and alcaldes, who were intrusted with the
					 execution of the general's orders. This system was pursued in every possible
					 direction ; on the right bank of the river at Alagon, Mallen, Tudela, Boya,
					 Taracona Epila, Almunia, Maria, Villa de Muel, Carineria, Fuentes, Zeila
					 Sanper, Alcaniz; and on the left bank, at Pina, Bujaralos, Candasnos, Fraga,
					 Zuera, Ayerbe, Anzanigo, Canfranc, and several of the Cinco Villas. The
					 officers commanding these fortified points, together with a garrison, and a
					 supply of ammunition and provisions proportionate to their wants, had
					 instructions to be most vigilantly watchful in every case, to defend themselves
					 to the last extremity against any party that might attack them, and to keep up
					 a frequent communication with the posts in their neighbourhood, and with
					 Saragossa, in order that they might be able to give every information of any
					 movements, or reported movements, that might come to their knowledge.. The
					 whole of this army of stations, which we were compelled to leave in our rear,
					 did not amount to much less than 12000 men, of every description, scattered to
					 a certain degree over the country ; but all of them occupying essential Points,
					 and supported by sufficient reserves, to act promptly and combinedly, should
					 circumstances render it necessary.
 These dispositions being made, general
					 Suchet proceeded first to Alcamiz and then to Caspe, in order to direct the
					 movement upon Tortosa with such a portion of his acting forces as he had
					 destined for the siege of that place. In the commencement of July, general
					 Habert assembled the 3rd division at Belpuig in the plain of Urgel, and after a
					 demonstration, the object of which was to induce a belief that he was about to
					 take the direction of Barcelona, he suddenly turned off to the right, directing
					 his march to the banks of the Ebro by Garriga, and arrived on the 5th at
					 Garcia, without being for a moment disturbed or even followed in his movements.
					 He had under his command eight battalions and a part of the 4th hussars, and
					 received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Tivenis and Tortosa
					 by the left bank of the Ebro, and in the mean while to keep his men together
					 and in a proper state to meet the enemy should any make their appearance.
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