Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service Chapter 24b - The Retreat from Mons : Le Cateau
My own head-quarters were at Sars-la-Bruyere, south-west of
Mons and Frameries, some six miles from the former and three from the latter.
That afternoon I motored round the outposts and reconnoitred the positions as
far as I had time, for the distances were great and my presence at my
head-quarters, with so much to arrange, was necessary for a considerable part
of the daylight available. In my hasty survey I had come to the conclusion
that, from a fighting point of view, our position was a very difficult one. The
ground on the enemy's side of the Canal commanded it from comparatively short
ranges, and was densely wooded, giving them the advantage of a covered
approach. Any idea of fighting a serious action on the outpost line was
therefore out of the question, although such a thing in any case would have
been impossible in view of the enormous extension of the Corps, covering as it
did twenty-one miles with only two Divisions.
I came to the conclusion that our only hope, if attacked in
force, would be to hold a less extended position in rear on which the outposts
could fall back. This, however, was not very encouraging, as although the
ground rose considerably on a general line some two to three miles south of the
Canal it was so broken up by the pitheads and wired enclosures, and so thickly
covered with houses, that any organised effective defence must involve great
risks. To obtain an accurate idea of the unsuitability of the ground, I
recommend a careful study of the graphic description given in the Official
History, written by Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., R.E., from
which I quote the following (page 63) :
" The space occupied by the II Corps in particular, within
the quadrangle Mons-FrameriesDourBoussu, is practically one huge
unsightly village, traversed by a vast number of devious cobbled roads which
lead from no particular starting-point to no particular destination, and broken
by pit-heads and colossal slag-heaps, often over a hundred feet high. It is, in
fact, a close and blind country, such as no army had yet been called upon to
fight in against a civilised enemy in a great campaign."
Then on our right was the salient town of Mons, open to fire
from north, east, and west, and quite indefensible, situated as we were.
However, that night I was happy in my mind, for official
news of the enemy given me indicated no great strength, and I fully expected
that the Chief's expressed intention of moving forward again next day would be
carried out. I had been given no information of the somewhat serious happenings
in the French Army on our right, which I learned
years later, namely, that it had been forced back, and was
already some nine miles south of Mons with a gap of at least nine miles between
the right of our I Corps and the left of the XVIII French Corps, thus leaving
us in a very vulnerable, indefensible, and salient position. Had I known of
this serious situation I doubt much if my night's rest would have been as
enjoyable as it proved to befor I should have been racking my brain as to
what the object of our remaining so isolated was and why we did not retire.
Mercifully, I was in blissful ignorancenor was I
disillusioned next morning when about 6 a.m. the Chief appeared at my
head-quarters, and, addressing his Corps and Cavalry Division Commanders
assembled there, told us (vide his dispatch of 7th September 1914) that little
more than one, or at most two, enemy Corps, with perhaps a Cavalry Division,
were facing the B.E.F. So it was evident that he too was in blissful ignorance
of the real situation. Sir John was in excellent form, and told us to be
prepared to move forward, or to fight where we were, but to get ready for the
latter by strengthening our outposts and preparing the bridges over the Canal
for demolition. I took the opportunity of emphasising the weakness of my
general line and the danger of holding on to the Mons salient, remarking that I
was issuing orders for the preparation of a retired position south-west and
clear of the town of Mons to cover, should a retirement become necessary, the
advanced troops at Nimy and Obourg who would have to fall back behind Mons, as
soon as things got so hot as to risk their being cut off. The Chief expressed
himself in agreement, and approved my action. He then went off to Valenciennes
to order the 19th Brigade, who were detraining there, to prolong the outpost
line from my left to Conde. The dispositions of the II Corps were roughly as
follows : 3rd Division (Hubert Hamilton). The 8th Infantry Brigade (Doran) on
the right in touch with the I Corps, the 2nd Royal Irish holding the hill "
Bois la Haul," just south-east of Mons. The 1st Gordons and
2nd Royal Scots about Harmignies. The 4th Middlesex in the
outpost line from Bois la Haut to Obourg, north-east of Mons. The 9th Infantry
Brigade (Shaw) on the left of the 8th, three battalions, the 4th Royal
Fusiliers, 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers, and lst/5th Fusiliers holding the outpost
line on the Canal from the left of the 4th Middlesex to the bridge of Mariette,
some six miles, with the 1st Lincolns in reserve at Cuesme, one mile south-west
of Mons.
The 7th Brigade (McCracken) in Divisional reserve about
Ciply, two miles south of Mons. The 5th Division (Sir Charles Fergusson)
continued the line along the Canal westwards from Mariette.
The 13th Brigade (Cuthbert) took the next three miles to Les
Herbieres. First came the 1st Royal West Kents with the 2nd Scottish Borderers
on their left, the other two battalions, the 2nd Duke of Wellingtons and 2nd
Yorkshire Light Infantry being in reserve in St. Ghislain. Lastly came the 14th
Brigade (Rolf) from Les Herbieres, two and a half miles to the extreme left of
the Corps at Pommeroeul bridge, the 1st East Surrey on the right with the 1st
Cornwall Light Infantry on the left, and the 2nd Suffolk and 2nd Manchester in
reserve.
The 15th Brigade (Gleichen), consisting of 1st Norfolk, 1st
Bedford, 1st Cheshire, and 1st Dorset, were preparing a position in rear and in
reserve about Dour.
I am not attempting to describe the positions of the
Artillery, for, owing to the broken nature of the ground, the Batteries and
even guns had to be very much scattered, and to take up positions where they
could. Even if I had personal knowledge of their several positions it would
take much space to describe them, and as it is I could only do so by copying
from the official account, which is at everyone's disposal; but I can briefly
say that the handling, initiative, and courageous action throughout this day
and the next was something even for that distinguished Corps to be proud of;
though even that standard was excelled by their deeds of heroism and
self-sacrifice at the battle of Le Cateau. Again, I shall not attempt a full
description of the fighting, but shall confine myself largely to my personal
experiences.
We were not left long in doubt as to the chances of an
action, for even whilst the C.-in-C. was talking to us at 6 a.m., though we did
not know it at the time, our cavalry was in contact and the 4th Middlesex on
outpost about Obourg were exchanging shots with the enemy. It was a Sunday
morning, thick and wet at first, but clearing later became a lovely day. The
church bells were sounding, and there were streams of people in every village
in their black Sunday clothes going to church as if nothing unusual was
happening.
At, as far as I recollect, about 9 a.m. I motored to the
left of my outpost line at Pommeroeul, and leaving the car crossed the bridge
and saw an interesting scrap between the Cornwalls and German scouts. I then
passed along east on the south side of the Canal when about 10 a.m. the first
German shell I had seen fired burst on the road just in front of my car close
to Jemappes. The German guns, however, had been busy opposite Mons some time
earlier, and this was natural from the nature of the enemy advance, which was
more or less in the form of a left wheel, their outer or right flank coming on
to the Canal last; in fact, some of our troops remained north of the Canal
until 6 p.m.
It was a day of desperate and heavy fighting, especially on
our right about Mons. In that salient and on the hill to the south-east of it,
" Bois la Haut," the 8th and 9th Brigades were tried to the utmost, the 4th
Middlesex losing half their strength; but they more than held their own and
eventually fell back, evacuating the salient with the greatest skill, and at
nightfall, although somewhat retired, our line was still unpenetrated. There
was, however, a moment when the danger of penetration was very serious.
At about 7 p.m. a report came in saying that the enemy had
penetrated the line near Frameries and were swarming through that village. I
had no troops left, and all I could do was to request the 5th Division to push
out to their right, which they did by sending the 1st Bedfords to Paturages.
Knowing the gap was appreciable owing to the left flank of the 3rd Division in
retiring having failed to join up with the right flank of the 5th Division, and
that if the Germans' realised it there was nothing to prevent their pushing
through in large numbers and rendering our position untenable, I sent the
following message to G.H.Q. :
" To G.H.Q., G 271, August 23rd. Third Division report at
6.47 p.m. the Germans are in front of his main position and are not attacking
at present, they are, however, working round 3rd Division on left flank. If it
should appear that there is a danger of my centre being pierced I can see no
course but to order a general retirement on Bavai position. Have I your
permission to adopt this course if it appears necessary ? From II Corps, 7.15
p.m. (Signed Oxley, Colonel.) "
I then jumped into a motor and went to General Haig's
head-quarters at Bonnet, some four miles away, and asked if he would allow
Haking's 5th Infantry Brigade, which was on the road about two and 'a half
miles from Frameries, to push on to cover the gap. I found Hubert Hamilton's
G.S.O.2, Lieutenant-Colonel F. B. Maurice, there on the same quest. Haig
readily gave his consent, and Maurice dashed off to tell Haking. The situation
had, however, been almost restored by the 9th Brigade, and the Germans driven
back before the 5th Brigade reached Frameries; but I would remark that although
I had contracted my front to about twelve miles, it was still far too large for
the troops I had and every man was practically in the front line, so that a
break through, with no reserves to meet it, must have entailed retreat.
Haking's borrowed Brigade remained to hold the gap.
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