AT the end of June, 1918, Admiral von Muller, the Chief of
the Emperor's Naval Cabinet, informed me that Admiral von Holtzendorff's state
of health made it improbable that he would be able to hold the post of Chief of
the Admiralty Staff much longer. In this event His Majesty had designated me as
his probable successor.
This information released me from the obligation that had
hitherto prevented me from suggesting a change of organisation in the
department which had directed the conduct of the war at sea. The system was a
failure, was not very popular in the Navy, and our success was less than we had
a right to expect. I could not very well recommend myself as head of this
department, all the more so as the command of the Fleet involved personal
danger, and I did not care to avoid this by getting a position on land. Even
the very frank discussions which had taken place between the Chief of the Naval
Staff and myself had not resulted in the full satisfaction of the demands of
the Fleet. My personal relations with Admiral von Holtzendorff enabled me to
speak to him without reserve. We had grown pretty intimate by serving together
on the same ships at different times. We were thrown together at sea for the
first time in 1884-86 on board the cruiser Bismarck, the flagship of
Rear-Admiral von Knorr, when we went to West Africa, East Africa and the South
Seas to visit our colonies there. After that I was navigating officer in
1895---96 in the cruiser Prinz Wilhelm, which Holtzendorff, a commander at the
time, commanded on a cruise to the Far East. Later on he offered me the post of
Chief of the Staff of the High Sea Fleet, which I held for two years, 1909 -
11, under his command as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. On all these
occasions I had learnt to appreciate his personality and his capacity as a
leader. For this reason I was grieved at the particular cause for the change,
but as the spell was broken I urged the Chief of the Naval Cabinet to
accomplish it in any case.
I had no occasion to complain of undue influence or
limitation of the Fleet by the Chief of the Naval Staff. But his position was
not clear; he seemed to us to yield too much to political pressure. The conduct
of the U-boat campaign was typical of it. Even at this moment there were
serious differences of opinion as to the way it should be carried on. The
forces of the Navy were scattered over the various theatres of war, and the
Commanders of the Fleet could not see any necessity for this. The Fleet formed
a sort of reservoir which was to satisfy all demands for personnel. Naturally
there was great opposition to any withdrawal of personnel from the Navy, unless
it was clearly conducive to the main aim of the war. But that aim could only be
achieved by the Fleet and the U-boats, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
felt himself responsible for this.
There was no post of command superior to his, where full
responsibility could be taken for the success of the conduct of war at sea. For
the Naval Staff was not a Supreme Command, but an organ of the Emperor as the
Supreme War Lord, which could not be bothered with details of the conduct of
the war. The relation of the Naval Staff to the Navy was not the same as that
of the Supreme Army Command to the Army on land. If, for instance, a plan of
campaign in Roumania is carried out successfully, that is essentially to the
credit of the Supreme Army Command, for it correctly estimated the strength and
capability of troops and leaders, and set them a task proportionate to their
abilities. In the war at sea the Naval Staff apportioned the existing ships and
boats to the different fields of operation-the Baltic, the North Sea, or
Flanders, the Mediterranean or foreign parts, and had to leave the officers in
command there to act independently in accordance with their general
instructions. On land the Supreme Command permanently controlled the war
operations; this was not the case at sea. If the Fleet had been defeated in
battle, no one would have dreamt of making the Naval Staff responsible, but
only the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. But there was need of some body which
should regulate the distribution of forces with a view to some definite end,
and not leave the success of naval activities to the individual admirals in
command in the different theatres of war.
The U-boat campaign had further complicated matters, because
all independent officers in command had U-boats assigned to them, and the Chief
of the Naval Staff had even placed certain of them, e.g. the U-cruisers, under
his own immediate command. There was need of exchange among the different
groups. The development ought to be regulated on uniform lines, and the
experiences gained by the individual commanders in their boats, including those
who specialised on the technical side, ought to be made of benefit to all.
Finally, the personnel of all the new boats, at any rate all the officers and
petty officers, had to be drawn from the Fleet.
That meant that the Chief of the Naval Staff must be
included in the number of those commanders who were directly responsible for
the conduct of the war. We felt the lack of a Supreme Command whose orders must
be unhesitatingly obeyed. Our organisation in peace time had not foreseen this.
In the year 1899 the Supreme Command of the Navy had been done away with,
because at that time two powerful authorities, generally pulling in different
directions, were detrimental to the development and building up of the Navy.
The Secretary of State, von Tirpitz, did not feel able successfully to carry
through the policy requisite 'For the steady development and growth of the
Fleet unless it corresponded in every particular with his own convictions. The
result was that the Naval Staff, which was all that was left untouched when the
Supreme Command of the Navy was abolished, had been thrown into the shade, and
the men appointed as Chiefs of the Staff were not for the most part such as
would, in case of war, have the authority of chosen leaders, who had proved
their ability as commanders of the Fleet.
When the Supreme Command ceased to exist the commanders of
the Fleet demanded more and more independence. They did not pay any attention
to strategic questions in peace time; tactics and development gave full
occupation to their activities. The Fleet commanders' chief responsibility in
the war lay in the apportionment of the most important units of the sea forces,
for the aim of naval warfare is to deal the enemy Fleet a destructive blow.
Success depends mainly on the skill of the leader. He must be thoroughly
familiar with the handling and the capabilities of his weapon-the Fleet. How to
bring about the encounter with the enemy must be left to him. Neither the place
nor the time can be fixed beforehand. For in contradistinction to the war on
land, the position and strength of the enemy are unknown.
Consequently it was thought that more or less indefinite
general directions would suffice, which the Naval Staff had to suggest and
transmit to the Fleet as orders from the Emperor, based on the Staff's
strategic considerations. This had been a mistake. The organisation which had
appeared useful for the building up of the Fleet in peace time hampered the
ability of the Fleet in war. The war at sea grew too extensive to be carried on
under the personal guidance of the Emperor, as it should have been in view of
the relation of the Supreme Naval authorities to one another. Politics,
technical matters, and strategy were all closely connected in this. The war
against commerce also, which we had to adopt, influenced our relations with the
neutrals. Technical considerations were involved in the decision as to whether
we were to build submarine or surface ships, but this again was dependent on
the course of our Naval strategy.
When it was realised that England did not intend to put
matters to the test in a battle, then the time had come to institute a Supreme
Command; all the more so when, towards the end of 1914, the views of the
Commanders of the Fleet, the Naval Staff and the Secretary of State upon the
course we should pursue were all divergent. Energetic measures should then have
been taken to provide the Navy with the leadership it required. Grand-Admiral
von Tirpitz himself was the most suitable person, for the Fleet would have
willingly subordinated itself to him, although he lacked actual experience in
handling it. That, however, was not a point of the greatest importance, as the
Fleet Commander had that experience. The point was to co-ordinate and make use
of all the forces which could contribute to the achievement of the Navy's aim.
The fact that the Grand Admiral was not appointed Supreme
Commander of the Navy was no doubt in part due to the differences between him
and the Chancellor. These grew more acute owing to our vacillating policy in
the U-boat campaign. When Tirpitz was no longer allowed to exercise his
influence in all-important questions touching the conduct of the war, and he
was not consulted as to the decision with regard to the U-boat campaign in
March, 1916, he, who had worked so admirably in organising our Fleet, felt
compelled to resign.
As the war was prolonged it became more difficult to provide
personnel and material for all the new exigencies; our warfare extended to far
distant parts, and there was a danger of diluting the forces collected in the
Fleet. The harder our task became, the more the difficulties that were put in
our way. There was delay in the repair of ships and U-boats, in the delivery of
new vessels, in the fulfillment of urgent demands and improvements. The
'Auxiliary Service Law was not calculated to increase the power of production
of the workpeople, and this also suffered from the deterioration in food. It
cost endless trouble to obtain from the Army Command technical workmen who were
badly needed. Naturally urgent Army needs had the preference. But convincing
representation of the needs of the Navy might have met with success in many
cases, for goodwill and understanding were certainly not lacking in the sister
service.
Between the Admiral in command of the Naval Corps, the
officer in Supreme Command of the Baltic, and the Fleet, absolute understanding
and the most friendly spirit prevailed whenever help was asked for. But that
was a lengthy way of arranging matters, and was an insufficient substitute for
a Supreme Command that could overlook the whole situation and give orders
accordingly.
The gradual decline in the monthly sinkings accomplished by
the U-boats filled one with anxiety. Many a U-boat with a splendid and
experienced commander did not return. The new commanders had to gain experience
under considerably less favourable conditions.
Day by day the commanders of the Fleet noted down the
positions of every single U-boat; its departure and return were followed with
care and suspense. All our thoughts centred on finding ways and means to keep
up the standard of their achievements and to increase them. There was never a
day when we were at sea that the commanders of the Fleet did not discuss this
with the officer in command of the U-boats ' and his Staff of picked
professional men. We felt that we were responsible for the attainment of such
an end to the war as had been promised to the German people, and that we could
achieve it by this means alone. The Fleet was animated by one sole idea we must
and will succeed. Every single vessel, battleship, torpedo-boat, minesweeper,
cruiser and airship, with their crews-all were permeated with the gravity and
importance of this task which 1 impressed on officers and men on every
occasion. New forces must be found which would under- take to complete the
work, which threatened to be a failure when handled as hitherto by the Naval
Staff and the Naval Cabinet.
A change of Secretary of State (Admiral von Capelle) seemed
also very desirable. It was not to be expected that a man who was convinced
that he had done all that was humanly possible would pledge himself, without
reserve, to carry out new proposals which would bring him into opposition with
his previous conduct of affairs.
It had taken six months of urging, from July, 1917, to
December of the same year, before a central organisation for U-boats - the
U-boat Office, demanded by the Fleet Command - had been instituted. Such was
the delay in carrying out demands or suggestions as the case might be whether
they referred to personnel, armament, or technical matters pertaining to
ship-building and so on; the working of the different departments was
inadequate for the needs of the times.
Though I was bound to the Fleet by such close ties, yet I
was ready to take over the post of Chief of the Naval Staff, provided that in
that capacity I should have definite powers of command. The Chief of the Naval
Cabinet objected that the Emperor would never consent to give up the Supreme
Command - a point on which I never insisted - but his doubts were not
justified. For the Emperor consented to the request without hesitation. It was
of course understood that the Supreme War Lord should be informed of the
general trend of matters and of important projects, and that his consent should
be obtained thereto. The practice hitherto followed of giving orders in the
Emperor's name on matters outside His Majesty's sphere of interest was rather
derogatory to the dignity of the Imperial Supreme Command. This incident proves
how little foundation there was for some reports as to the Emperor's attitude,
reports which emanated from those in his immediate entourage, and easily led to
unpleasant decisions being kept from him.
I had such an experience when commanding the Fleet in
January, 1917. The matter in question was the design of a new first-class
battleship. I happened to be in Berlin for a consultation at the Admiralty, and
the Emperor had commanded my presence when the Secretary of State made his
report, the Chief of the Naval Staff also attending. The Secretary of State
brought two designs for the projected ship, a so-called battleship-cruiser;
that is to say, a ship which should combine the qualities of both kinds of
ship-gun-power, power of resistance and speed.
Unless such a ship were of gigantic dimensions none of these
qualities could be fully developed. This was the reason why up till then two
distinct types had been built; the cruiser, with powerful guns, and high speed
attained at the expense of its power of resistance, and the battleship, with
the most powerful guns, and great powers of resistance at the expense of its
speed.
The Emperor had repeatedly stated that he considered it
necessary to merge these two types in one; hence these designs. The principle
of the ship uniting all these qualities was to be accepted, but a choice was to
be made between the two designs for carrying this into effect. The Chief of the
Naval Staff and the Secretary of State were of opinion that the Emperor would
not budge from what they supposed to be his attitude towards the matter, and
they urged me to submit to it. But I had expressed myself to the contrary
beforehand, and I repeated my arguments. The Emperor was soon convinced by our
war experiences that we must continue to have two types of fighting ships with
different speeds, and the Secretary of State thereupon received orders to have
new designs made on the old lines that had proved successful-much to the
gratification of his Chief Constructor.
Nor was it ever my experience that the Emperor rejected
unpleasant information. In the two months of September and October, 1918, the
unfavourable reports far outnumbered all others; His Majesty. always received
them with the greatest calm and common sense.
If I had foreseen the rapid development of events I would
have preferred remaining with the Fleet rather than organising the conduct of
the war at sea, for my plans never reached fulfilment. Nor do I think it
impossible that I might have succeeded in making the Fleet obey my orders and
exert its full powers at the eleventh hour. My only excuse for this lack of
foresight lies in the fact that my observation of the spirit of the crews was
based on the undiminished readiness to undertake any warlike enterprise which
they had always shown up to then, and further that no hint of the widespread
disintegration in our domestic conditions ever reached the leaders of the Fleet
from any reliable political source, just as little as it reached the Admiralty
later on.
On July 28 I was summoned to General Headquarters at Spa;
Admiral von Holtzendorff had again, on the advice of his doctor, asked His
Majesty to relieve him of his post, and his request had been granted. At the
same time a decision was to be reached as to whether the U-boat campaign should
be extended to America. The Naval Staff had urgently recommended the
declaration of a blockade of the American coast, as this was a necessary
preliminary to carrying out a successful U-boat campaign. As the chief ports
concerned all lay on a strip Of 300 nautical miles in length, it was thought
that it would be easier to get at the traffic there. The troopships - the
immense supplies that went from America to the Western theatre of war, and the
large amount of coast traffic from South to North America were to be attacked
there.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made strong
Objection to the declaration of this blockade. If Chile and the Argentine were
thereby also induced to join the Entente, Spain would follow, and that was the
only country that still protected German interests abroad. Quite apart from the
political reasons urged by the Foreign Secretary, I did not think it probable
that any good could result from extending the war to the American coast; for
the declaration of a blockade entailed vigorous and decisive warfare. We could
not count on stationing more than three boats there until the end of the year.
No great success could be expected from that, especially as there was the added
risk of the long voyage out. Moreover, to carry the war over to America would
open prospects of an extension of the war that were out of proportion to our
strength. Ours was a war of defence in Europe. America's interference in this
quarrel was contrary to all her best traditions. No doubt there were a great
number of intelligent Americans who did not approve of America's taking part,
when they calmly and impartially considered the circumstances that had led to
the world-war. Perhaps they remembered their own subjection - the manner in
which England, their Mother Country, had deprived them of freedom, and how they
had fought for their independence and successfully gained it with German
assistance. If American troops were injured off the French and English coasts
that was but the inevitable result of American interference in European
quarrels.
But the feeling against us in that country would be very
different if we began an enterprise which we had not the power to carry through
successfully, and which must have an unnecessarily irritating effect. Three
U-boats off the American coast could effect no essential amelioration in the
results of our U-boat campaign. The decision in that campaign would be reached
simply and solely by reduction of tonnage, and it must be sought in the main
blockade area round England.
The officer commanding the U-boats was quite of my opinion
that every possibility of adding to the achievements in this area must be made
use of. From all the seas ships crowded to the British Isles. It was easier to
deal an effective blow there than to follow the far-reaching trade routes, and
try to attack them at their points of departure. And if an American transport
now and then fell a victim to a U-boat on setting out from the American coast,
that would not ward off the danger which threatened us from that source. It
would be very easy for the transports to get through the dangerous strip near
the coast by night, or to gain the open sea at any time under protection. We
had learnt in the Franco-British blockaded area, where all the trade routes of
the oceans meet, how difficult it was to pick out the transports from among all
the other shipping for attack. If, for that purpose, we directed our main
attention to the southern ports of France, as had been tried several times, the
traffic was simply diverted as soon as the U-boat danger became manifest, and
our U-boats were stationed there in vain, and achieved no results in the war
against commerce. It was only by concentrating our activities on the main area
round England that we could ensure success by sufficiently intensifying the
ever-growing lack of means of transport, the effects of which were evident in
so many directions. The French ports were not, however, left unmolested, and
the minelayers in particular were busy there. The increase in the number of
seaworthy and efficient U-cruisers that could stay at sea for months ought to
bring more success in our activities against English convoy traffic. They were
able to seek the convoys far out at sea, to keep in touch with them, and call
up a considerable number of U-boats, as soon as their sphere of activity was
reached. Hitherto the attempts at co-operation between the smaller U-boats
without U-cruisers had been a failure because of the lack of suitable boats to
lead them.
We had long desired to apply to the U-boat war the
principles of scouting and keeping in touch, which were applied by the surface
warships. Now we had the opportunity to do so, and we must not let it slip by
diverting the boats suitable for this purpose to a far distant field of
operations. That was the decisive factor which induced me to oppose the
declaration of a blockade of the American coast, and the scheme was accordingly
abandoned. The Supreme Army Command did not care what means the Navy used, so
long as it achieved success. Their desire to have more transports sunk could
only be realised by raising the total number of sinkings. The U-boat must
attack whatever happened to come within range of her tubes. Naturally the enemy
protected the transports especially well, and took them through the danger zone
at times which were most awkward for the U-boats.
The greater the number of steamers sunk the more likelihood
there was that a transport would be sunk. We should more quickly attain our end
with the U-boat campaign by keeping the blockaded area round England and the
coast of France under the greatest possible pressure than by extending the
blockaded area to include the American coast.
August 11 was the date fixed for me to take over the affairs
of the Naval Staff. Before that I had to take leave of the Fleet. I had to hand
over the command to my successor and make all preparations for the organisation
of the conduct of the war at sea. Admiral von Hipper had been chosen as
commander of the Fleet. His great experience in matters appertaining to the
Fleet, his efficiency in all the tactical situations in which he had found
himself with his cruisers, seemed to. point to him as the most suitable person
to whom I could confidently hand over the weapon from which I never thought to
be separated in this life. The signs of faithful affection shown to me by the
Fleet made my parting no easier, but I hoped to be able to continue to serve it
in my new position. I felt the parting from my Staff especially keenly. The
Chief of the Staff, Rear-Admiral von Trotha, on this occasion again showed his
unselfishness by giving up some very important colleagues to assist me in the
Navy command. The former Chief of the Department of Operations in the Fleet,
Commodore von Levetzow, who had meanwhile been promoted to the command of
Scouting Division II, had placed himself at my disposal as Chief of my Staff.
I took from the Naval Staff the necessary personnel for my
command under the supervision of a Special Chief of Staff, and transferred them
to General Headquarters where it was possible to keep in constant touch with
the Emperor and the Supreme Army Command, as this seemed most desirable to me
in view of situations which demanded prompt decisions. As a substitute for the
Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral Friedrich von Bulow was appointed to
supervise matters in Berlin, which dealt mostly with reports, the supply of
personnel and material, and political affairs. That did not entail any real
change in the organisation, but only a regrouping of the Naval Staff for the
purpose of the war. The fundamental improvement lay in the powers of command
that the Chief of the Naval Staff was allowed to exercise in the "conduct of
the war."
On August 12 I went to the General Headquarters of the
General Field-Marshal to introduce myself to him in my new capacity and to
consult with him and General Ludendorff upon the situation and further plans
for the conduct of the war. Both officers were much impressed with the gravity
of the events which had occurred on August 8, and had placed our war on land
definitely on the defensive. They both admitted that the main hope of a
favourable end to the war lay in a successful offensive of the U-boats, and
General Ludendorff promised, in spite of the great lack of personnel in the
Army, to do his utmost to help to develop it further.
Until the necessary accommodation for my Staff had been
found at Spa, and they could move there, the business of the Naval Staff was
concerned with the new regrouping, and initial preparations were made for the
extension of the U-boat campaign that had been planned. The results of the last
months had shown that the successes of individual U-boats had steadily
decreased. This reduction in successes was due mainly to the stronger and more
perfect measures of defence taken by the enemy, and also to the loss of some of
the older and more experienced commanders. Taking into consideration the then
rate of U-boat construction, we had to expect, in spite of the steady increase
in the number of U-boats, that the figures of the monthly sinkings, which had
already diminished to 500,000 tons would be still further reduced. Judging by
the reports as to building, it was to be feared that within a short time the
newly-constructed tonnage would be greater than the amount sunk. The success of
the U-boat campaign might thereby be greatly diminished. A mere defensive could
not help us to tolerable peace. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary for us
to develop our only means of an offensive with all the strength at Germany's
disposal, so as to attain our goal - a tolerable peace. In view of the Peace
Conference, it seemed also advisable for us to have a strong weapon in the
shape of U-boats with which we could bring pressure to bear on our enemies.
But if we wanted to achieve great things with the U-boat
campaign then the whole industrial power of Germany must be at our disposal for
the accomplishment of our task. I had got into communication with the principal
controllers of industry, and at a conference with them and the Imperial
Ministry of Marine had drawn up the following figures as the indispensable
minimum for the increase in U-boats:
In the last quarter of 1918 ... |
... per month 16 |
In the first quarter of 1919 ... |
... per month 20 |
In the second quarter of 1919 ... |
... per month 25 |
In the third quarter of 1919 ... |
... per month 30 |
When I asked the U-boat Office why in January, 1917, when
the unlimited U-boat campaign was decided on, more boats were not ordered to be
built than was actually the case I received the following answer:
"As a result of the decision in favour of an intensified
U-boat campaign no orders for boats on a large scale were placed. In February,
1917, only the following were ordered: 6 U-boats of the normal type, 45
U-B-boats, and 3 commercial boats. The large order for 95 U-boats was not given
till June, 1917."
No definite information as to the reason for this building
policy was forthcoming, but it was certainly strongly influenced by the opinion
of the Chief of the Naval Staff that the boats would achieve their effect
within a definite period of time, and that the existing U-boats would suffice.
Moreover, in the Imperial Ministry of Marine the opinion prevailed that the
capacity of the workmen for production was no longer to be depended upon.
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