No ships were sent up by Captain Strasser, the Commander of
Airships, on April G. His estimate of the weather conditions proved quite
correct, for in the course of the afternoon the slight northeasterly wind
veered round to the east and when night came a regular storm was blowing. While
the air raids of the previous night were proceeding several torpedo-boats
started out from Horns Reef in a north-west and westerly direction and kept the
outpost forces in constant activity. It led, however, to no engagement with the
enemy.
From April 13 to April 19 the Fleet was kept in constant
expectation of an English attack, news having been received that one was
pending. But the enemy did not show himself.
BOMBARDMENT OF YARMOUTH AND LOWESTOFT
On April 24, Easter Monday, the Fleet put out on an
important enterprise which, like that in the beginning of March, was directed
towards the Hoofden, but was to be extended farther so as to force the enemy
out of port. I expected to achieve this by bombarding coastal towns and
carrying out air raids on England the night the Fleet went out. Both these
actions would probably result in counter measures being taken by the enemy that
would give our forces an opportunity to attack. On the occasion of the advance
of March 5 - 6 the enemy preferred withdrawing all his forces into port, as we
learnt afterwards from intercepted wireless messages, as soon as he had news of
our advance, either through agents or from submarines in the North Sea
The news we obtained from the enemy had repeatedly announced
strong enemy forces in the northern section of the North Sea under the
Norwegian coast; forces had also been sighted in the Hoofden and harbours on
the south-east coast of England so that an opportunity would probably occur for
our Fleet to push in between those two divisions of the enemy Fleet and attack
with equal strength that section which should first present itself. It was,
therefore, obvious that the most suitable direction for attack would be towards
the south-east counties of England. If the enemy then wished to cut off our
return he would have to move into the neighbourhood of Terschelling Bank, where
the waters were favourable for offering battle. With luck we might even succeed
in attacking the enemy advancing from the Hoofden on both sides; on the south
with the forces told off to bombard the coast and on the north with the Main
Fleet.
Lowestoft and Yarmouth were the only coastal towns it was
intended to bombard. Both were fortified and were important military points of
support for the enemy Lowestoft for mine-laying and sweeping; Yarmouth as a
base for the submarines whence they started on their expeditions to the Bight.
The destruction, therefore, of the harbours and other military establishments
of both these coastal towns was a matter of great military importance, apart
from the object of the bombardment in calling out the enemy. Simultaneous
air-raids on southern England would offer the advantages of mutual support for
the airships and the sea forces. The airships would reconnoitre for the forces
afloat on their way to and fro, while the latter would be able to rescue the
airships should they meet disaster. It was also hoped there might be an
opportunity for trade-war under prize conditions.
All the available High Sea forces were assembled, including
Squadron II, and the Chief Command of the Naval Corps in Flanders was enjoined
to keep his available U-boats in readiness. The Naval Corps also offered to
station two U-boats east of Lowestoft to facilitate the advance; they did
excellent service in assisting the bombardment. The U-boats at the disposal of
the High Sea Command were placed in a position to attack the Firth of Forth and
the southern egress from the Firth was closed by a U-minelayer.
Eight of the newer airships were selected for the raid and
three older ones were ordered to hold themselves in readiness on the second day
in the rear of the fleet for reconnoitring. If at all possible, the bombardment
was to take the towns by surprise at daybreak, in order to prevent
counter-measures by the enemy, such as calling up submarines from Yarmouth to
protect the coast. The forces intended to accompany the cruisers had to
endeavour to keep, not actually in the Hoofden, but in the open waters west and
north of Terschelling Bank in case it should come to a fight, as that was the
only position where liberty of action in all eventual developments could be
ensured. The bombardment of both the coastal towns was entrusted to the
battle-cruisers. They were supported by Scouting Division II and two fast
torpedo-boat flotillas (VI and IX). The Main Fleet, consisting of Squadrons I,
II and III, Scouting Division IV, and the remainder of the torpedo flotillas
was to accompany the battle-cruisers to the Hoofden until the bombardment was
over, in order, if necessary, to protect them against superior enemy forces.
At noon on the 24th all the forces, including the airships,
started. The course led first through the south opening in the barrier at
Norderney and then north, round a minefield laid down by the English out of
sight of the Dutch coast, and into the Hoofden where the bombardment was to
open at daybreak and last for about thirty minutes. At 4 P.M. the movement
received an unwelcome set-back owing to a message from Rear-Admiral
Bödicker, leader of the reconnaissance ships, that his flagship, the
battle-cruiser Seydlitz had struck a mine and her forward torpedo
compartment was damaged. The ship was thus debarred from taking part in the
expedition; she was still able to do 15 knots and returned to harbour under her
own steam. The leader was, therefore, obliged to hoist his flag in another
cruiser. The route on which the ship had struck the mine had been searched and
swept last on the night of the 22nd and 23rd and had been constantly used by
light forces on their night patrols.
Owing to this occurrence the battle-cruisers behind the
Seydlitz stopped and turned according to agreement, awaiting further
orders in case they, too, should come across mines. As the Seydlitz
turned to follow them in order to transfer the admiral to the
Lützow, two of the ships simultaneously reported the track of a
torpedo and submarines. With that danger so near it would not have been
advisable to attempt to stop the ship and transfer the admiral to another; and
as the cruiser was already badly damaged, it would have been dangerous to
expose her to still further injury. The Seydlitz continued, therefore,
on her westerly course and the Chief of Reconnaissance on board a torpedo-boat
reached the Lützow later and there resumed his duties. The
Seydlitz was escorted on her homeward way by two torpedo-boats and "L7"
and reached the harbour without further misadventure.
In consequence of this incident, the Fleet Command thought
fit to alter the intended course, and the only alternative was to take the
route along the coast of East Friesland. The weather being so very clear, it
would have to be borne in mind that in following that route the ships could be
observed from the islands of Rottum and Schiermonnikoog and the news probably
dispatched farther. Unfortunately this lessened the chance of carrying out a
surprise bombardment of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, but there was no reason on that
account to give it up altogether. Relying on aerial reconnaissance, further
developments might be expected and the enterprise was continued.
Towards 8 P.M. a wireless message from the Naval Staff
confirmed what the Naval Corps in Flanders had already reported at noon, that
since 6 A.M. numerous enemy forces had been assembled off the Belgian coast, at
the mouth of the Scheldt; it was not possible to divine their intention, but
very probably it was connected with a bombardment of the coast of Flanders. It
was welcome news for our Fleet to hear of the assemblage of enemy forces there.
Another wireless announced that on the morning of the 23rd large squadrons of
English warships of all types had been sighted off Lindesnaes, the south-west
point of Norway. I could count, therefore, on my presumption that the English
Fleet was divided into two sections being correct.
At 9.30 P.M. a message was sent us from Bruges that
according lo an intercepted English wireless all patrol boats had been ordered
back to port. This showed that the meeting of our battle-cruisers with English
submarines during the afternoon had resulted in their sending news of our
movements.
Shortly before daybreak reports were received from the
airships of the results of their attack. They were obliged to fight against
unfavourable wind conditions, and bad visibility over the land; they also met
with strong counter-action. The six air-ships taking part had raided Norwich,
Lincoln, Harwich and Ipswich and had been engaged with outpost ships. None had
been damaged and they were then in the act of returning home. At 5 A.M. our
large cruisers approached the coast off Lowestoft. Good support was afforded
them by the U-boats placed in position by the Naval Corps. The light cruiser
Rostock, which formed the flank cover for the battle-cruisers, reported
enemy ships and destroyers in a west south-west direction. But as the light was
not good enough to open fire, Admiral Bödicker proceeded to bombard the
towns. This was carried out at a distance of from 100130 hm. Excellent
results were observed In the harbour and the answering fire was weak. A
north-west course was then taken to proceed with the bombardment of Great
Yarmouth and to engage the ships reported by the Rostock.
Meanwhile the Rostock, supported by the light cruiser
Elbing, had kept in touch with the enemy forces in the endeavour to bring them
nearer to the battle-cruisers. The ships in question were four modern light
cruisers and about twelve destroyers. As soon, however, as they caught sight of
our battle-cruisers they turned at full speed southwards. We opened fire on
them at a distance of 130 hm. until they were beyond our range. Many hits were
observed, and on one of the cruisers a big fire was plainly visible. The high
speed kept up by the enemy made pursuit useless. The cruisers then shaped their
course in the direction of our Main Fleet and reported that their task was
accomplished.
During the bombardment of the two coastal towns, the light
cruiser Frankfurt sank an armed patrol steamer by gunfire. second one was sunk
by the leader of Torpedo-boat Flotilla VI, "G41," the crew of which were
rescued. From what the latter stated she was the King Stephen, of evil repute,
which had allowed the crew of the airship "L 19 " to perish. These men
certainly denied most emphatically that they were on the trawler then, and laid
the blame on a former crew. They contradicted themselves so constantly,
however, that the captain and the engineer grew very suspicious, and as the
steamer had been used for war service the crew were made prisoners.
At 5.30 A.M. "L 9" reported being chased by aeroplanes in a
south-westerly direction. When the fleet was sighted the airmen departed,
probably to announce the approach of our ships, which at that time were
steaming on a south-westerly course to meet the cruisers. At the same moment "
L 11" and "L 23 " came in sight; they had not been able to discover the enemy.
At 6 A.M., therefore, when the cruisers had reported the conclusion of the
bombardment, Terschelling Bank was made for according to plan. Towards 7.30
A.M. the Naval Corps in Flanders reported that the English ships assembled
there had been ordered by wireless, which was intercepted, to return. The
English destroyers were to finish coaling and then move on to Dunkirk.
An approach, therefore, on the part of the enemy was not to
be looked for from that quarter. The only hope now left was that enemy forces
might be encountered off Terschelling. As we drew near to that zone, the Fleet
was constantly obliged to evade submarine attacks, but no other enemy forces
were met.
The return trip passed without further incident. Two
neutral steamers, as well as some smaller vessels were stopped and searched for
contraband goods. The enemy, hearing of the advance of our forces, withdrew all
his ships from the Belgian coast and made no effort to locate us. It appears
from subsequent English statements that the English Fleet had put to sea the
day before for one of the usual North Sea expeditions, and it would be
interesting to find out whether it could have had an opportunity of crossing
our path in the Bight.
When the Seydlitz was docked a hole of 90 sq. m. was
found in her, through which about 1,400 tons of water had poured into the ship.
Eleven of the men had been killed at their post in the torpedo chamber. In
spite of the considerable quantity of ammunition stored there, no further
explosion occurred or the disaster would have been far greater.
Early in May the weather conditions were such as to allow of
a resumption of the air raids on England. But this favourable phase in the
weather was not of so long duration as in the preceding month, which was quite
exceptional. Two raids were carried out in which eight airships took part. " L
20 " was lost in the second raid as a strong south-westerly wind had arisen,
and the airship, owing to engine trouble, was unable to reach the home coast.
The captain, Commander Stabbert, made, therefore, for the Norwegian coast,
where he came down with his damaged airship in the neighbourhood of
Jäderen, where the crew alighted and were interned. Then ensued a period
of short nights which caused a cessation in the airships' raiding activities as
the hours of darkness were not enough to afford them sufficient protection, and
it was also obvious that latterly the defensive measures had become much more
effectual. But the Fleet made good use of the airships for all reconnoitring
purposes in connection with important enterprises, which gained in value
through cooperation with the U-boats and on which all the more energy had to be
expended since the trade-war by the U-boats had been stopped since the end of
April.
Just as we were proceeding to Lowestoft a wireless message
was received from the Chief of the Naval Staff, to the effect that trade war by
U-boats was only to be carried out now in accordance with prize regulations.
This was the result of the American protest in the case of the Sussex disaster.
As I could not expect the U-boats to carry on a war of that description owing
to the heavy casualties that might be expected, I had called back by wireless
all the boats engaged in the trade-war, and subsequently received approval of
this action in high quarters It was left to me until further notice to employ
the U-boats in purely military enterprises. This helped still further to
protect the German Bight, as definite areas could now he continuously occupied
and we could expect early reports of enemy movements; we also hoped to find
opportunities to attack the enemy submarines employed as guard-ships. The
experiences of our U-boats confirmed the danger caused by the enemy submarines,
which, appearing unexpectedly, had come to be very unpleasant adversaries, and
we intended, therefore, to make use of our boats for defence purposes.
* To ascertain its position wireless signals are sent out
from the airship, picked up at two different stations, and registered on the
map. The position fixed is then transmitted to the airship by wireless. The
whole proceeding occupies the shortest space of time, but when several airships
are on an expedition together the wireless must be worked most carefully to
avoid mutual misunderstandings and mistakes.
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