ON March 5, the day after the return of the Moewe, the High
Sea Fleet, under my command, carried out the first of its greater enterprises,
partaking of the nature of a more extended advance. The idea prompting this
move was to attack the enemy light forces that were constantly reported in the
Hoofden, and thus attract support from the English harbours to the south, and
if possible force them between the pincers formed by our advanced cruisers and
the Main Fleet following in the rear. At daybreak the distance between the
battleships and the cruisers was approximately 30 nautical miles. The cruisers
were then to advance from a position Terschelling Bank Lightship S.S.E. IS
nautical miles to the Hoofden, and push on to the northern boundary of the
English minefield. The battleships were to follow the course of the cruisers up
to l0 A.M., when they would have reached latitude 53" 30', provided that in the
meantime our action had not been checked by intervening circumstances. Squadron
II (the older battleships) did not form part of this expedition, but was held
ready, with a minesweeping division, to secure the safety of the Bight, in
order to keep the return route open for the Fleet. Two flotillas accompanied
the cruisers; the others were with the Main Fleet. To ensure the safety of the
proceeding an airship was allotted to the Chief of Reconnaissance, while other
airships were to reconnoitre early the following day in the sector north-west
of Heligoland as far distant as 200 nautical miles, to protect the flank and
rear of the Fleet. Should the weather the preceding night be favourable for
airships, advantage was to be taken of it. This was carried out, and led to a
very effective bombing of the important naval yards at Hull, on the Humber. A
graphic picture of the attack is given in the description by one of the airship
commanders who took part, Captain Victor Schulze, on board the "L 11," but who
has since died the death of a hero. He writes:
" Our orders were: ' March 5, in morning, " L 11," with "L
13 " and "L 14," to attack England in the north.' At noon (on 4th) an ascent
was made with the object of attacking the naval yard at Rosyth. In consequence,
however, of an ever-increasing strong north-north-west wind, bringing heavy
snow and hailstorms with it, it was decided on the way to seek out the munition
factories at Middlesbrough instead of proceeding to Rosyth. The only shipping
traffic noticeable was limited to a few fishing-boats off the Dogger Bank.
Following the throwing out of benzine casks, the airship, towards lo P.M., was
fired at through a thin bank of clouds, but without success, and the incident
was not worth noticing. At 10.45 P.M. the English coast was crossed between
Flamborough Head and Spurn Head at Hornsea, which led to the belief that the
north wind was stronger. The ship now steered northwards over the distinctly
visible snow-clad coast. Wherever the landscape was not hidden from view by
heavy snow-clouds visibility was good. The upper line of cloud was at a height
of 2,000-3,000 m.; above, the sky was bright and starry. Violent hailstorms
again came on, the ship became coated with ice, and although all water was
discharged and the temperature of the air was 16 degrees, she could not rise
above 2,000 m. Not until just before the attack, and after a further discharge
of benzine, did she achieve a somewhat risky 2,300 m. The antennæ and the
ends of the metal props in gondola and corridor glistened through the snow and
hail with balls of lightSt. Elmo's fire. The gondola and platform were
thickly covered with snow. When the weather cleared at 1 A.M., it appeared from
the position of the ship that to steer ,further north would be fruitless with
the velocity of the wind at 12 doms (doms2 metres per second).
"Meanwhile the course of the Humber was now distinguishable
in the snowy landscape further south, offering a very favourable chance of
attack. The town of Hull was well darkened, but from where ' L 11 ' was
stationed we could easily make out the dropping of bombs from ' L 14 '. Fresh
snow-clouds then interfered with the view, but I had time to spare and remained
at my post until the clouds cleared away in an hour's time. At 2 A.M. ' L 11 '
opened the attack and first dropped some bombs on Hull to induce the defence
batteries and searchlights to disclose their position, for if that failed the
ship could not have attacked against so strong a wind. The town remained quiet
and dark, but at that moment the clouds cleared away and disclosed the
following picture. The town and environs were white with the freshly-fallen
snow. Although plunged in darkness the town lay sharply defined under the
starlit sky with its streets, blocks of houses, quays and harbour basins just
below the airship. A few lights moved in the streets. The ship, taking a
northerly course and with all her engines at high pressure, was poised over her
objective and stood by. For twenty minutes, following my instructions, bombs
were dropped quite composedly on the harbour and docks and the effect of each
bomb carefully watched. The first bomb hit the quay, knocking a great piece out
of it; a second hit the middle of the dock-gate of a harbour basin. The bomb
fell so accurately on the gate that it might have been taken for a shot
deliberately aimed at it. Buildings fell down like so many houses built of
cards. One bomb in particular had a tremendous effect. Near the spot where it
exploded houses kept falling on each side until at last a huge black hole stood
out on the snowy ground near the harbour. A similar large black spot in the
neighbourhood was apparently caused by 'L 14'. People were seen through the
telescope running hither and thither in the light of the flames. Ships that had
been hit began moving about in the harbour. All counter-action at and round
Hull was limited to a few weak searchlights that failed to find the ship, and
to some isolated firing. While the bombs were being dropped, the airship
ventured up to 2,700 m.
" When fully convinced of the excellent effect of the bombs
dropped on Hull, I decided to drop the remainder on the fortifications at
Immingham which, as I had already noticed, had been heavily bombed by ' L 14 '.
The airship made for Immingham with the last five explosive bombs and was
received at once by four strong searchlights and very lively gun-fire. The
searchlights tried in vain to find the ship through the light clouds just
passing over, for although it was brightly lit up by them they always moved
farther away. South of the searchlights on the bank the batteries were using
much ammunition. From 40 to 50 fiery lights or fire-balls were scattered round
the ship on all sides, above and below. The height these missiles reached was
reckoned at 3,000 m. or more. The first explosive bomb that fell among the
searchlights extinguished first one and then all the others. No other results
were observed. Towards the end of the attack on Hull the fore engine was put
permanently out of action by the stoppage of the water gauge and the consequent
freezing of the oil and water pipes at a temperature of 19 degrees; at
Immingham the aft engine was out of action for half an hour. The coast was
crossed at 2.40 A.M. on the return journey. Again heavy snow and hailstorms
accompanied by electric disturbances were encountered. In the space of three
minutes a sudden squall carried the ship upwards from 2,400 to 3,200 m., 250 m.
above our previous highest altitude. Coming down shortly afterwards the
elevating gear got out of order, but the ship was worked by the crew as well as
could be until the damage was repaired, though we were forced to rise again to
3,200 m. At 5 A.M. the rear engine gave way again and, owing to the freezing of
oil and water, stopped altogether shortly before we landed. At 7 A.M. we met
the First Scouting Division of Squadrons I and II 30 nautical miles
north-north-west of the Terschelling-Bank Lightship. At 2 P.M. we landed safely
at Nordholz. The ship was quite able to fly again."
The airship did the trip in 26 hours; it must be mentioned
in this connection that the crew of a raider is so limited that all the men
have to be on duty the whole time.
The Naval Corps in Flanders supported the Fleet's enterprise
by stationing 12 U-boats off the English south-east coast. In spite of good
visibility, there was no encounter with the enemy. The expedition, therefore,
was only useful for the purpose of practicing unity of command, and the
handling of individual ships under circumstances likely to arise during an
offensive engagement of any big unit. The return voyage was made an occasion
for different exercises in manuvring the Fleet in fighting formation
until we were compelled to withdraw, alarmed by the sighting of enemy
submarines, for which the Fleet at Terschelling would have presented a good
target. After our return all opportunity for further operations was put a stop
to for a time owing to the bad weather, and to high east and north-east winds
which our airships only just succeeded in escaping.
The dismissal of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz as Secretary of
State of the Imperial Admiralty which was announced to the Fleet Command on
March 18 aroused great sympathy, not only in view of his services in connection
with the many-sided development of the Fleet through long years and in all
branches of maritime service, but because, in these critical times for the
country, much anxiety was aroused at the thought of being deprived of the
services of a man who had shown himself to be a genial personality and of
unwavering energy. This change in the conduct of the Naval Department, in
particular, gave rise to grave fears as to the prompt carrying out of resolute
and adequate U-boat warfare.
At the beginning of March the decision in this connection
had again been postponed for four weeks. The Fleet was therefore bound all the
more to aim at active action against the enemy, and every attention was given
to that purpose by the new Fleet Command.
Meanwhile the English, by an unexpected attack, provided us
with the opportunity of testing our preparations. The repeated air-raids, and
particularly a very big and successful one on London on February I, roused them
to make an effort to seek out and destroy these troublesome raiders in their
own homes. The hangars at Tondern were the nearest. There had been no further
attack on this group since the first unsuccessful one on Christmas Day, 1914.
On March 25, in very unfavourable weather for flyingso much so that our
own scouting machines did not go up owing to fog and snowstormsan attack
was made at 9.30 A.M. by some torpedo boat destroyers on our outpost group at
List. They sank two fishing steamers that could have reported the attack, but
were themselves obliged to withdraw before our aeroplanes which had gone up
from List, and which dropped bombs on the enemy, hitting the destroyer Medusa.
She was abandoned later on in a sinking condition. The English report gave out
that the loss of the Medusa was owing to a collision with the destroyer
Laverock.
Various reports were made by our aeroplanes, from which we
gathered that an aerial attack had started from two vessels carrying
aeroplanes, which were supported by battle-cruisers, light cruisers and
destroyers. We were not able at once to determine what the intention
waswhether there was to be a simultaneous attack from the west on the
hangars at Hage (south of Norderney), or whether we were to expect an
encircling movement of the enemy against our forces sent northwards, in an
effort to force them to come out. The counter-action of our aeroplanes and the
bad weather compelled all the five English airmen to come down. Two of them
were picked up by one of their own torpedo-boats; the other three were taken by
our aeroplanes. They did not succeed in doing any damage.
The English attack caused great commotion among our outpost
forces, as well as among all the other ships, which at once got ready to put to
sea, until the further purpose of the enemy was revealed. Our cruisers and
several flotillas went in pursuit of the retiring enemy, who evidently did not
attach much importance to the rescue of the airmen; but the weather becoming
still worse, we were unable to get near the ships. There was an encounter that
night between our torpedo-boats and English light cruisers, when the English
cruiser Cleopatra succeeded in ramming and sinking one of our torpedo-boats, "
G 194,' which had crossed her bows by mistake.
During these nocturnal proceedings another torpedo-boat, "S
22," Commander Karl Galster, struck a mine 55 " 45" North Lat., and 5"' 10"
East Long. This boat broke in two at once; the fore-part sank quickly, the
remainder floated for about five minutes and then suddenly went to the bottom.
The hurrahs from the crew, led by the commander, proved that they stood firm at
their posts to the very last. Torpedo-boat "S 18 " immediately tried to render
assistance, but the wind and the high sea running made it impossible, and in
spite of every effort only ten petty officers and seven of the crew were saved.
We learned from the English report that the same night the Cleopatra was also
run into by the English cruiser Undaunted, the latter receiving such heavy
damage that she had to be towed into harbour. An English wireless intercepted
during the night stated that a warship, together with destroyers, had tried to
take a damaged English destroyer in tow, and it might be presumed that the
ships would proceed northwards by night and return again at daybreak when there
would be the possibility of encountering and capturing certain units of the
enemy. Squadron II and Scouting Divisions I and IV were ordered to proceed to
55" 10' N. Lat. and 6" 0' E. Long., whither Squadrons I and II would follow;
the flagship was with Squadron III. At 6.30 A.M. the cruisers reported that the
sea was so rough that an engagement was impossible; the push was therefore
given up as hopeless. We heard later that the same reason had induced the
English to abandon the destroyer Medusa and return home very much battered by
the storm.
At the end of March, by way of reprisal for the attempt to
injure our aerial fleet, our airships enjoyed a very successful series of
expeditions which, aided by a combination of favourable weather and dark
nights, resulted in five successive attacks. It is difficult for airships to
bring back an exact statement of their successes owing to the great altitude at
which they fly, and also to the darkness and their exposure to anti-aircraft
defences. The reports issued by the English official censor were, therefore,
the only means of ascertaining the extent of the damage done, which was often
represented as being of little importance in order to calm the fears of the
population. But it is certain that at the time the uninterruptedly recurring
raids caused a great feeling of panic, as the destruction in London itself
surpassed anything ever before known. On our side, for the first time, we had
to deplore the loss of an airship, brought down by enemy anti-aircraft guns. "L
15," Commander Breithaupt, was forced down on to the water at the mouth of the
Thames after the airship's gondola had been repeatedly hit by shells. The crew,
two officers and sixteen men, were rescued by English boats and taken prisoner;
they did not, however, succeed in towing in the airship, the destruction of
which had been provided for. It is worthy of note that in the night of the
2nd-3rd the Firth of Forth was reached for the first time, and ships lying
there and buildings along the Firth were attacked: Bad weather set in again on
April 6 and put an end to this exceptionally successful period. "L 11 " took
part more than once in the attacks and its commander has given the following
description:
"Order: ' L 11,' together with ' L 14,' to attack England
south or centre on morning of April 1st.' At 12 noon an ascent was made for the
purpose of attacking England in the south, but owing to the wind soon veering
round to north-west, the centre of the coast was made for. There was lively
traffic among steam-trawlers off the Dogger Bank, and the English wireless was
distinctly heard at work. In spite of throwing out two casks of benzine, the
temperature of the air did not allow of the ship rising above 2,200 m.; at 10
P.M. the English coast was reached south of the Tyne. While trying to bomb the
docks on the Tyne and cross the coast, the ship was greeted with violent
firing, which came from the whole coastal area north and south of the river. To
draw back and seek the required weather side for the attack would have occupied
several hours with the prevailing wind (W.N.W., 5-7 doms.) I decided not to
cross the batteries on account of not being very high in relation to the
firing, and also because of slow progress against the wind and the absolutely
clear atmosphere up above. I fixed, therefore, on the town of Sunderland, with
its extensive docks and the blast furnaces north-west of the town. Keeping on
the weather side, the airships dropped explosive bombs on some works where one
blast-furnace was blown up with a terrible detonation, sending out flames and
smoke. The factories and dock buildings of Sunderland, now brightly
illuminated, were then bombed with good results. The effect was grand; blocks
of houses and rows of streets collapsed entirely; large fires broke out in
places and a dense black cloud, from which bright sparks flew high, was caused
by one bomb. A second explosive bomb was at once dropped at the same spot;
judging from the situation, it may have been a railway station. While over
Sunderland, the airship was caught by a powerful searchlight and was pelted
with shrapnel and fire-balls, but to no purpose. The concussion from a shell
bursting near the airship was felt as though she had been hit. After leaving
the town, two other searchlights tried to get the ship, but only with partial
success. Then followed slight firing, apparently with machine-guns. The last
explosive bombs were dropped with good aim on two blast-furnace works in the
neighbourhood of Middlesbrough. On returning, we again saw numbers of steam
trawlers off the Dogger Bank. At lo A.M., April 2nd, we landed at Nordholz."
The day following "L 11 " again set out for a raid on
England in company with "L 17," and reported as follows:
"Owing to the expected warm temperature of the air, only
five mechanics and forty-five bombs were carried; the spare parts were limited;
two machine-guns and a landing-rope were left behind, and the supply of benzine
very sparingly measured out, as both going and coming back the wind was
expected to be behind us. The ascent was made at 2.30 P.M. The flight was so
rapid that the last bearings¹ taken showed that the English coast would be
reached near Sheringham at about 10.30 P.M. As the atmosphere was becoming
still thicker, it was impossible to distinguish anything beyond a few dim
lights. As the coast could not be made out at the expected time, I turned by
degrees out of my previous course W. ½ S. to S.W. to S., presuming that
the wind would have gone further south on land. Finally, however, the bearings
taken at 1.10 A.M. revealed the surprising fact that the slight W.S.W. wind
blowing had risen to 8'-10 doms. When, therefore, we found at 2.45 A.M. that
the ship was over the land, a further advance towards London became
purposeless. Moreover, on ascertaining the exact position, it was too late, and
in view of the strength and direction of the wind, to turn off towards the
mouth of the Humber. So long as the darkness lasted, I determined to try for
some objective in the county of Norfolk. Norwich, which was in complete
darkness, could not be made out.
"Towards 3.55 A.M., after 'L 11 had crossed the coast close
to the west of Yarmouth, violent gun-fire was observed through the mist in the
rear. A turn was made, and altogether thirteen well aimed bombs were dropped on
the place where the firing came from. We had to give up the idea of staying
longer on the coast as at the altitude of the airship day was already beginning
to break. The return journey, as was anticipated, was favoured at a high
altitude by a fresh W.S.W. wind. At 10 A.M. we landed at Nordholz."
On April 5, " L 11 " with " L 13 " and " 16 " again went up
for a raid on the English Midlands. An account of this expedition will serve to
give the reader some idea of the strain and exertions to which our airships'
crews were exposed on such occasions.
" At 9.45 p.m. the airship crossed the distinctly visible
coast south of Flamborough Head and took a course for Sheffield. When over Hull
to the north the airship was found to be over several newly erected batteries
with four very strong searchlights, which caught up the ship easily in the very
clear air; whereupon, from 10.10 to 10 30 an unusually heavy firing with shells
and shrapnel was kept up. The aim was good; many shells burst quite close to
the airship, causing the frame to shake violently. The next battery was at once
attacked and silenced by explosive bombs. Being at the low altitude of 2,300
metres and in such clear air it was not considered advisable to continue to
pass over the numerous other batteries, so we turned round intending to take a
southerly course outside the coast in order to rise higher when the moon had
gone down and to proceed inland. In setting off, the rear engine was put out of
order through worn-out crank bearings. The commander decided, therefore, to put
himself on the lee side of the north-north-east wind and look for Hartlepool.
The line of the coast and the course of the rivers were just as plainly visible
as on the map. North and south of Flamborough Head there was much shipping
activity. Several neutral vessels were distinguishable by the bright lights
above their neutrality marking.
"At 2 A.M., just off Hartlepool, the fore engine gave out.
The attack on the town was abandoned, and it was decided on the way back to
destroy a large iron factory at Whitby. Even from the high altitude of the
airship, the factory appeared to be a very extensive establishment with many
brightly illuminated blast furnaces and numerous buildings. It was situated on
the shore and had steam extinguishing apparatus. The airship hovered
sufficiently long over this factory to drop carefully aimed bombs. The
distinctly visible result consisted not only in the utter destruction of the
furnaces and buildings through fire and explosion, but there were also heavy
explosions in the darker sections of the factory, which led to the conclusion
that the entire establishment had been destroyed. At 10.30 A.M. the airship got
into a dense fog on the return journey, and with a view to safer navigation
went over land and made good her way at 50 m. altitude, landing at Nordholz at
3 P.M. in clear weather."
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