AFTER taking over command of the Fleet my first and most
important task was to draw up a plan for the future tactics of the High Sea
Fleet and to work out a programme of operations. The success hitherto of the
conduct of naval warfare lay in the effect produced by the existence of the
Fleet, the coastal defence, the influence exercised on neutrals, and the
support given to the Army. The conviction that English maritime power was a
serious menace to our capability of resistance seemed to make it imperative
that, if a successful issue of the war were to be expected, it must be waged
far more energetically against that adversary. There was no question of England
giving in unless she was made to feel the pressure of war at home much more
forcibly than hitherto had been the case. After having carried out her
transport of troops from overseas on a much larger scale than was anticipated,
thereby imposing on the country great sacrifices both of money and men, her
determination for war was bound to increase, in order to reap the benefits of
those efforts and to compensate for the blunders made, such as the surrender of
Antwerp and the abandonment of the Dardanelles enterprise. So far, the war, for
England, was merely a question of money and men. There was no lack of either,
thanks to the support from the Colonies, the systematic manner in which
volunteers were pressed into Kitchener's Army, and the ruthless employment of
coloured auxiliaries.
Thus England was better able to stand the war for a
lengthened period than we were, if the hunger blockade were to continue to
oppress the country. The English public never thought of urging the Fleet to
more active warfare; its object was achieved without its being weakened or
being forced to make undue sacrifices. The nation readily understood this,
especially when it was made clear to them that the Fleet had succeeded in
keeping open those overseas communications on which the country was so
dependent. This fact was specially brought into prominence by the destruction
of our cruiser squadron off the Falkland Islands.
The danger from the U-boat warfare, which at first appeared
serious, was reduced to slight importance owing to the mutual interests with
America. But when the danger really was recognised, England prepared to ward it
off, and did splendid work in this connection. On our part, the conduct of
naval warfare in 1915 was less satisfactory. Even though we succeeded in
preventing the neutrals from joining our opponents, it always remained an open
question to what cause it could be attributed. If the utility of our High Sea
Fleet were not made more distinctly manifest, then its deeds were not
sufficient to justify its existence and the vast sums exacted from the
resources of our people for its maintenance. The principal task stood out
clearly definedto punish England in such a way as to deprive her speedily
and thoroughly of the inclination to continue the war. That might be expected
if success could be achieved either by a blow at her sea power centred in her
Navy, or at her financial lifepreferably both.
The continued numerical superiority of the English Fleet
from the beginning of the war kept us at a disadvantage; but, from a purely
tactical point of view, our Battle Fleet, by the addition of four ships of the
"König " class, was very differently organised from formerly, when
Squadron II had to form part of the fighting line and was confronted in battle
with "Dreadnoughts " with which it could not possibly cope. From the beginning
of 1915 we also had had a double squadron of "Dreadnought " ships at our
disposal (Squadrons I and III) and were therefore better able to avoid bringing
the ships of Squadron II into a situation in battle where they must inevitably
have suffered losses. Certainly the English had added greatly to their fighting
powers by ships of the "Queen Elizabeth " class which must have been ready
early in 1915. They carried guns of 38-c.m. calibre, were strongly
armour-plated, and had a speed of 25 knots, in all of which they were nominally
the same as our battle-cruisers, whereas in the strength of their attack they
appeared to be vastly superior to all our vessels.
The then prevailing conditions of strength kept us from
seeking a decisive battle with the enemy. Our conduct of the naval war was
rather aimed at preventing a decisive battle being forced on us by the enemy.
This might perhaps occur if our tactics began to be so troublesome to him that
he would try at all costs to get rid of the German Fleet. It might, for
instance, become necessary, if the U-boat war succeeded again in seriously
threatening English economic life. Should the English thus manuvre for a
decisive battle, they could fix the time so as to allow the full use of their
vast superiority, whereas some of our ships would be either under repair or
otherwise unfit for service, or absent in the Baltic for exercises, of which
the enemy would be well informed.
But for us to get into touch with the English Fleet, a
definite and systematic operation would have had to be carried out with the
view of compelling the enemy to give up his waiting tactics and send out forces
which would provide us with favourable conditions of attack. The methods
previously employed had failed. Either they were undertaken with inferior
forcesin the case of an advance by cruisers the Main Fleet could not
intervene in time to be of useor else, as in most of the 1915
enterprises, they had not pushed on far enough for an encounter with important
units of the enemy Fleet.
If we wished to attempt an effective and far-reaching
offensive, it was necessary that we should be masters in our own house. The
waters of our coast must be so controlled that we could be left free to develop
and have no fear of being surprised and called out against our will. With the
exception of the Fleet, we had nothing that the enemy could attack, as
unfortunately our maritime trade had been put down from the beginning. The
enemy, however, was still vulnerable in so many places that it was surely
possible to find ample opportunity to make him feel the gravity of the war!
The ways and means of effecting this were the U-boat trade
war, mines, trade-war in the North and on the open seas, aerial warfare and
aggressive action of the High Sea forces in the North Sea. The U-boat and
aerial warfare had already started; the three other factors were to be operated
in combination. The activities in the near future were laid down in a programme
of operations submitted to the Naval Staff and their general sanction obtained.
Above all things, every leader, as well as each commander, was to be told his
part, so as to facilitate and encourage independent action in accordance with
the combined plan.
The first and most important task was the safety of the
German Bight. Fresh rules were laid down dealing with the action of the Fleet
when in the Bight, and instructions issued concerning protection and outpost
duty. Arrangements were also made as to action under an enemy attack which
would save waiting for lengthy orders in an urgent emergency, and would render
it possible for all subordinate officers to play the part expected of them in
such an event. The aim of the organisation was to keep the Bight clear by means
of aeroplanes, outpost flotillas, minesweeping formations, and
barrier-breakers, and regular reconnaissance, guard, and mine-searching service
was established. The outpost-boats were to form a support for the active
protective craft in the North Sea, be sufficiently strong to meet a surprise
hostile attack and always ready to pick up at sea any forces returning to
harbour. The command of the protective services was, as hitherto, retained by
the Chief of the Reconnaissance. The actual aerial reconnaissance in the
vicinity was undertaken by aeroplanes and airships from the stations at
Liston the island of SyltHeligoland, and Borkum. The North Sea
Outpost Flotilla, the Coastal Defence Flotilla from the Ems, and boats of the
Harbour Flotilla, were ready for guard service; their duties consisted chiefly
in driving away enemy submarines. As a rule, the following positions were
occupied:
The List Group: The waters off List (to keep neutral fishing
boats out of German coastal waters).
The North Group: The Amrum Bank passage.
Line I: The Heligoland Hever Line.
Line 2: The HeligolandOuter Jade Line.
The Outer Group: The JadeNorderney line and the
barrier opening at Norderney.
Heligoland boats: North and West of the island.
Jade boats: Off the Jade.
S. Group: Three boats (chiefly intended to fight enemy
submarines, or for other special duties, as, for instance, the cutting of
cables).
The chief object of these outpost boats was to search the
Inner German Bight for enemy submarines, for which purpose they set out every
day in groups from the lines where they were stationed. The service of the
outpost boats, some eighty fishing steamers, was so arranged that half were on
duty for three days and then had three days off. The Ems Coastal Defence
Flotilla had the guarding of the waters off East and West Ems, and westward to
about 6 degrees E. Longitude. The Harbour Flotilla boats joined in when there
was a chase after submarines which might have shown themselves at the mouth of
the river. A torpedo-boat flotilla stationed on the Ems also did duty when
required, and helped further to ensure the safety of the sea area off the
Ems.
The regular mine-sweeping service consisted of two
Minesweeping Divisions and one Auxiliary Flotilla. The latter was composed of
vessels that had only been requisitioned for the purpose since the war, and
were mostly trawlers. They were specially suitable for the North Sea, owing to
their sea-going qualities, but we lost several of them because of their deep
draught. When a mine-sweeping division was off duty the crews were billeted at
Cuxhaven, while the men on leave from the half-flotilla of the Auxiliary
Flotilla were quartered at Wilhelmshaven. For their mine-sweeping duties all
those boats were armed in order that they might be prepared to fight
submarines. As soon as hostile submarines were sighted within their area they
had to stop their minesweeping and take part in the chase.
The barrier-breaker service consisted of three groups of
barrier breakers to every four steamers, internally constructed so as to enable
them to keep afloat should they strike a mine. At the outbreak of war we had no
apparatus whatever for sweeping up mines and protecting the steamers. Every
effort was made, however, to invent such an apparatus, which, as soon as it had
been tested, was at once supplied to the barrier-breakers and the minesearching
division.
Special credit is due to Captain Walter Krah, Chief of the
Auxiliary Mine-Flotilla, who profited by much practical experience and was
successful in his efforts to avert unnecessary losses in his flotilla. It was
the duty of the barrier-breaker group to protect the navigation of certain
channels, chiefly those where our minelaying divisions had been at work, and to
make sure that no mines had been laid by the enemy in the interval. The
activity of our minelayers could not be entirely concealed from the enemy. When
they were working in the inner section of the Bight, the enemy submarines had
every opportunity for their observations, and the farther the mine belt was
pushed out in the North Sea the nearer it drew to the area of English
observation planes. The English were in advance of us with the Curtis plane, a
hydroplane which, even with a considerable sea running, was able to keep on the
water and so husband its strength.
The search for, and the chasing of, hostile submarines was
principally the business of the torpedo-boats. The outpost boats had, of
course, to keep a look-out for submarines, and had to follow up on any occasion
when there was a chance of fighting them; but they had not the speed, nor were
their numbers sufficient to carry out a systematic search and pursuit. The
torpedo boats of the outpost service were told off for that purpose. The same
flotillas were employed when there was a question of warding off the submarines
from any ships or units engaged in special enterprises. The safety of the
German Bight at nightto ensure which the guardships were too far apart
besides being inadequate in armamentwas further ensured by torpedo-boat
patrols taken from the outpost service which cruised along the line of
guardships and the shores of the German Bight.
In order not to keep the entire Fleet constantly under
steam and thus overtire both men and machinery and use up material to no
purpose, and yet provide that they should be ready with considerable forces for
any enemy enterprises, an outpost service was organised. In the Jade there lay
always in readiness a squadron of battleships, two battle-cruisers, a
cruiser-leader of torpedo-boats, and a torpedo-boats flotilla; a scouting
division of light cruisers were in the Jade and the Weser, a torpedo-boat
flotilla in Heligoland harbour, half the ships of Squadron II in the Cuxhaven
Roads, at Altenbruch; and, if sufficient torpedo-boats were available, another
torpedo-boat half-flotilla was stationed on the Ems or in List Deep (at
Sylt) constituting approximately half the total forces of the High Sea
Fleet. The ships were kept clear to put to sea from their station
three-quarters of an hour after the order reached them. The torpedo-boats
flotilla at Heligoland was held ready to run out immediately, and the flotilla
on the Jade three-quarters of an hour after receipt of an order.
The outpost forces were under the command of the Senior
Naval Commander stationed on the Jade. In the event of a sudden enemy attack,
his duty was to arrange independently for the necessary measures of defence,
and to exercise the command. If the High Sea Command had any duty to assign to
him, it was restricted to a suggestion or general directions, as, for instance,
to station torpedo-boats at such end such a place at daybreak, leaving the rest
to be carried out by the Chief of the U-boat forces.
The other ships, not belonging to the outpost service, lay,
half of them in harbour (about a fourth part of the fleet), the other half
remaining on the inner roads at Wilhelmshaven or Brunsbuttel. The torpedo-boats
off outpost duty were always allowed to enter harbours. The ships off duty had
to seize that opportunity to carry out such necessary repairs as could be done
by their own men; ships that had been long in dock for refitting and repairs
were regarded as being in the same category. The usual preparedness of ships
lying in the inner roads and in harbour was fixed at three hours. But whenever
news came which seemed to necessitate the calling out of the ships, orders were
issued to hurry the preparations, the entire crew remained on board, and the
ships kept ready, on receipt of further orders, to weigh anchor at once.
These far-reaching measures for the protection of the
German Bight were, above all, intended to ensure that the Fleet should be able
to take up a position in line if it was deemed advisable to pass out in
expectation of an enemy attack. General regulations were issued for two
eventualities; the one, in case information and messages were received
announcing an impending hostile attack, and the other, in case the enemy came
entirely unexpectedly. It was not long before there was an opportunity to test
them in practice.
Finally the defence resources of the German Bight were
improved by adding to the already existing minefields, partly by laying them
adjacent to those laid by the enemy, which he was forced to avoid. The
intention of establishing a safe area for assembling within the line Horns
ReefTerschelling, was soon carried out, as the enemy laid his minefields
in still further concentric rings outside that line.
Constant navigation and firing exercises by separate units
as well as by the assembled Fleet, were carried on within this zone, and they
were very rarely interrupted by an alarm of submarines. The dispatch of units
for practice in the Baltic was no longer so necessary, and the readiness of the
Fleet for action was perceptibly improved.
Heligoland, which at the beginning of the war was our
advanced outpost, had thus assumed the character of a point of support in the
rear, from which radiated a free zone extending over a radius of 120 nautical
miles. Unfortunately the island never had occasion to use her excellent
armament on the enemy. But the newly constructed harbour was of great service
to the light forces of the Fleet, besides which the possession of the island
was indispensable in order that a fleet might be able to leave our estuaries.
Even though security from enemy attacks was necessary and
called for immediate action, nevertheless a still more important duty was that
of attacking and injuring the enemy. To this end various enterprises were
started. Foremost among these were nocturnal advances by light forces in the
boundary area of the German Bight in order to destroy enemy forces stationed
there, the holding up of suspicious craft, and readiness to afford help to
airships raiding England, which always took place at night. These advances were
carried out by several flotillas led by an escorting cruiser. They were
supported by a scouting division of light cruisers sent either to the Ems or to
a certain quadrant in the North Sea. The battle-cruisers were told off to the
Schillig Roads, or deployed in line at sea; all other outpost ships were held
in strictest readiness, and all measures were taken to ensure the speedy
intervention of vessels lying in the Roads. In this way, the entire Fleet was
kept in a certain state of tension, and unvarying alertness in view of
eventualities at sea was maintained in order to be prepared at once to take
part in the proceedings.
A further system of enterprise was to prolong these
nocturnal sallies till daybreak in order to patrol a more extended area, in
which case the entire Fleet had to be at sea as a support. The furthest
advanced flotillas received support from Scouting Divisions I and II which,
reinforced by one or two flotillas, followed them at a suitable distance. The
extension of such enterprises was designed to reach to the Skagerrak and the
Hoofden.
Finally, other important enterprises were planned, such as
the bombardment of coastal towns to exercise a still greater pressure on the
enemy and induce him to take counter-measures which would afford us an
opportunity to engage part or the whole of his Fleet in battle under conditions
favourable to ourselves.
In all these enterprises the co-operation of the Naval
Corps in Flanders was desirable by stationing their U-boats along the nearest
stretch of coast and thereby supporting the Fleet. This was carried out
regularly, and with the greatest readiness.
The employment of our U-boats was of fundamental importance
for our warfare against England. They could be used directly against English
trade or against the English naval forces. The decision in the matter
influenced the operations very considerably. It was not advisable to embark on
both methods simultaneously, as most probably neither would then, achieve
success. Also the poor success resulting from our U-boat action on English
warships in the North Sea seemed to point to a decided preference for trade
war. In military circles, there was no doubt that success in trade war could
only be looked for if the U-boat were empowered to act according to its own
special methods; any restrictions in that respect would greatly reduce the
chances of success. The decision in the matter lay in the political zone. It
was therefore necessary that the political leaders should recognise what we
were compelled to do to achieve our war aim. Hitherto our politicians, out of
anxiety with regard to America or in order not to exasperate England to the
utmost, had not been able to decide on energetic action against England in the
naval war. The naval authorities, however, should have known what they had to
reckon with in order to be able to beat down England's resistance. It was also
their duty to protest against enterprises specially unsuited to the U-boat,
which inevitably led to useless sacrifices.
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