However, the sacrifice it had involved had not keen
incurred in vain. It was not merely that it had cost the enemy a new cruiser.
Far more important was the impression that this proof of a bold spirit of
enterprise must have made on friend and foe alike. The situation at the outset
thus appeared in such a light that in view of these aggressive operations the
enemy thought that he could best protect himself by withdrawing to northern
waters, and did not take the other alternative of closing our sally ports
himself. Throughout the whole war not a single mine was sown in our estuaries,
notwithstanding the thousands upon thousands which were employed in the open
waters of the North Sea.
As the next few days passed without incident, and
aeroplanes and airships had made no discoveries, while incoming steamers
reported that English battleships were only to be seen at a great distance (by
Aberdeen) from the German Bight, our business was now to discover the
whereabouts of the enemy and get to close quarters with him if we were to bring
about an equalisation of strength. For this purpose we had at our disposal the
destroyers and submarines which could be spared from the defensive organisation
of the Heligoland Bight.
Commander Bauer, in command of the U-boats, was convinced
that the defensive employment of submarines in a narrow circle round Heligoland
was useless, as there was only a slight probability that the enemy would
approach so close, and even if he did it was doubtful whether the boats would
get a chance to shoot. The necessity of perpetually coming in and going out of
the harbour of Heligoland, a difficult process in view of the methods employed
in the defensive system, led to a useless strain on the material and injury to
the boats. He therefore represented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet that
only the offensive use of U-boats could bring about a change. The number of
boats employed must certainly be larger, but the prospects of success would be
greater still.
The justice of this argument was recognised, and a decision
was taken which was extremely important for the further course of the war. Nor
was there much hesitation in carrying it into execution, for the U-boats
received orders to proceed on August 6 against English battleships, the
presence of which was suspected in the North Sea. These ships were supposed to
be about zoo nautical miles from Heligoland and charged with the duty of
intercepting some of our battleships which ought to be on their way from Kiel
round Skagen into the North Sea because the passage of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal
presented too great difficulties Ten U-boats were assigned to this enterprise,
and six days were allowed for it.
This cruise was to carry the ships across the entire North
Sea and as far north as the Orkneys. The boats were left to their own devices,
as the cruisers Hamburg and Stettin, parent ships of the U-boat flotilla,
could, of course, not accompany it the whole! way. They were only to cover the
first run of the boats, a hundred miles or so, and endeavour to draw off any
enemy light craft from the U-boats in the direction of Heligoland. The
submarines themselves were not to pay any attention to such ships, as their
goal was the enemy battleships. It was only for the return journey that the
boats were left a free hand to do the enemy all the damage they could. The
weather being thick and rainy, and the visibility poor, was not favourable for
the enterprise, and indications pointed to its becoming worse. As the latter
eventuality did not materialise, however, the commander gave the order to put
to sea.
In so great an area, and taking into account the rapid
changes which experience shows may be expected, it is very difficult to
forecast the weather in the North Sea. The decision was, therefore, a brilliant
tribute to the fiery enthusiasm of the new weapon, which had never been faced
with a task of such magnitude in peace. The course was to be taken in such a
way that the submarines, in line ahead with seven-mile intervals between them,
first negotiated a stretch of 300 nautical miles in a north-westerly direction,
then turned and went back to a line directly between Scapa Flow and Stavanger,
which they were to reach about severity-two hours after putting to sea. They
were to remain on this line until 6 o'clock in the evening of the next
dayin all about thirty-nine hoursand then return to Heligoland. One
boat had to return when 225 nautical miles from Heligoland, on account of
trouble in her Diesel engines. Two others, commanded by Lieutenant-Commanders
Count Schweinitz and Pohle, were lost. All the rest carried out their allotted
task and were back by August T I.
Nothing was seen of the enemy, with the exception of a four
funnelled cruiser which emerged out of the mist for a short time. All that was
known of the lost boats was that one of them was still in wireless
communication early on August 8. On the 9th the region in which the U-boats
were lying was shrouded in mist, and the wind was blowing with force 6. It was
only on August 15 that we learnt that a large part of the English Fleet had
been in the same area and had there destroyed six German herring boats after
taking their crews on board. Fog and the amount of sea that wind of a force 6
means are the most unfavourable conditions conceivable for a submarine, in view
of the fact that the conning-tower is so low down in the water. It is to be
assumed that the missing boats had been surprised by English cruisers in
weather of this kind and rammed before they had time to dive.
It was certainly regrettable that at the very moment of
meeting the English Fleet-was protected by mist, that two of our boats had
fallen victims, and that this first enterprise, so smartly carried out, had not
been crowned by the success it deserved. The loss of two boats had no
depressing effect whatever on the crews. It rather increased their
determination to do even better.
The course of this six-day cruise cleared the way for the
further exploitation of the U-boat weapon, the great importance of which lay in
its power of endurance and its independence, two characteristics which appeared
at their true value for the first time in this cruise under war conditions. In
these two respects the U-boats were superior to all surface vessels in the
Fleet. The destroyers, in particular, were not to be compared with them for
their ability to remain at sea. Their fuel capacity was too small for that
purpose, and when going at high speed the consumption of coal increased out of
all proportion. Further, as the big ships needed the co-operation of the
smaller as submarine-screens and minesweepers, these, too, were dependent on
their smaller consorts for the length of time they could remain at sea,
especially when they were in areas in which regard had to be paid to the
submarine danger.
Our naval operations took a decisive turn as a result of
this cruise, and though the change was gradually introduced, it dates from this
enterprise. For that reason it has been described in rather more detail than
would be justified, seeing that a tangible success was not achieved. The first
proof of the ability of the submarine to remain at sea for a long time had been
given, and progress was made along the lines I have mentioned, thanks to the
greatest perseverance, so that the submarine, from being merely a coastal
defence machine, as was originally planned, became the most effective
long-range weapon.
The other splendid quality of the submarine is its
independence, by which I mean that it is not dependent on the support and
cooperation of ships or craft of other types. Whilst a force of surface ships
comprises various classes, according to the presumed strength of the enemy, the
submarine needs no help to attack, and in defence is not so dependent on speed
as the surface ships, as it has a sure protection in its ability to dive. This
again increases its radius of action, for whereas a surface ship, meeting a
superior enemy, has no other resource but to make use of its speedand
that means a large consumption of fueldiving means a very great economy
in engine-power. In the submarine there is no question of driving the engines
too hard in such a situation, as the boat can escape from the enemy by diving.
The engines need not therefore be constructed to stand perpetual changes of
speed.
It is not surprising that the special importance of these
technical advantages was not recognised until the war came, for they first came
to light thanks to the energy of the personnel, who seemed to despise all
difficulties, although going to sea in these small craft involves incredible
personal discomforts of all kinds. The advantages of the submarine service
first became of practical value through the fact that human strength of will
brought men voluntarily to display such endurance as was shown in our boats.
Patriotism was the motive-power of the ships' companies.
The fact that an English offensive did not materialise in
the first weeks of the war gave cause for reflection, for with every day's
grace the enemy gave us he was abandoning some of the advantage of his earlier
mobilisation, while our coast defences were improved. The sweep of
light-cruisers and destroyers which, starting out star-wise from Heligoland,
had scoured the seas over a circumference of about 100 sea miles had produced
nothing. Yet while the U-boats were on that cruise to the north which has
already been discussed, four other U-boats went on a patrol about 200 miles
west, until they were on a level with the Thames estuary. They discovered
several lines of destroyers patrolling on about Lat. 52°, but of larger
ships nothing was seen. The impression must have been forced on the
Commander-in-Chief, as indeed all of us, that the English Fleet was following a
strategic plan other than that with which we were inclined to credit it. It
appeared probable that the 2nd and 3rd Fleets were concentrated to protect the
transport of troops in the English Channel.
The bulk of the 1st English Fleet must be supposed to be in
the northern part of the North Sea, to which our light forces had not yet
penetrated. Further, we had not yet heard anything from the ten U-boats sent
out in that direction, so apparently they too had seen nothing. Should we now
attempt to bring the English 1st Fleet to action ? We had at our disposal 13 "
Dreadnoughts," 8 older battleships, 4 battle-cruisers (counting in
Blücher), a few light cruisers, and 7 destroyer flotillas. With
these the Commander-in-Chief intended to give battle, with full confidence in
victory. What held him back was the reflection that the whereabouts of the 1st
English Fleet was absolutely unknown, and it was therefore questionable whether
it could be found in the time at our disposal which could not be more
than two days and nights on account of the fuel capacity of the destroyers. In
the meantime, the German Bight would be without any protection against
minelaying and other enterprises, and there would be no flank protection on the
west. On the other hand, our ships might suffer losses from the operations of
enemy submarines, for which there would be no compensation in the way of
victory if the English Fleet were not found. We knew from various sources that
we had to reckon with English submarines. Such an attempt was therefore
abandoned, and in its place a series of patrolling and minelaying operations
were set on foot which carried the war right to the English coast in the
following weeks.
With this decision began the trying period of waiting for
the battleship squadrons, and a start was made with the operations intended to
equalise the opposing forces, operations which, apart from mine successes,
rested on the anticipation that our destroyers would find opportunities for
attack in their nocturnal raids. The lack of scoutsfor the new
battle-cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann could not be
put to such uses if they were to be held ready for battlemade it
essential that U-boats should be employed on reconnaissance duties.
As early as August 14 new tasks were assigned to the U-boats
which had returned from their cruise to the West on the 11th; and, indeed, the
boats under the command of Lieutenant-Commanders Gayer and Hersing were to
cross the North Sea from the Norwegian Coast (by Egersund) in the direction of
Peterhead, while a third U-boat (Hoppe) observed the English forces patrolling
before the Humber with a view to securing data for minelaying. They brought
valuable information about the enemy's defensive measures, but they had not
seen any large ships. The length of time they had spent under water was
remarkable. For instance, Gayer's ship had been compelled by destroyers to
remain under water six and a quarter hours on August 16, eleven and
three-quarters on the 17th, and eleven and a quarter on the 18th.
Let us now cast a glance at the chances for attack which
presented themselves to the enemy. It could not possibly be unknown to him that
the German Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. The reports of spies from
Holland and Denmark could not have left any doubt about that. If the English
Fleet made a demonstration against Sylt or the East Frisian I lands it would
have compelled our Fleet to come out of the estuaries unless we were prepared
to allow them a bombardment without retaliation, and they would thus have an
opportunity of using their submarines which were patrolling at the mouths of
the Jade and Elbe. A success for their submarines would be satisfaction enough
for them if we did not follow them out to sea. They could arrange their
approach in such a way that they took up a favourable position in the early
morning hours to offer battle to our fleet as it came up, or if they appeared
with only part of their forces they could promptly retire before a superior
German force and limit themselves to the operations of their submarines. The
only danger in such an attack lay in the possibility of a nocturnal meeting
with our destroyers. This danger was not to be overestimated, as the English
could plan their entrance into the German Bight in such a way that our
destroyers, which were dependent on darkness, would be already on their way
back to the Bight at the time the enemy was approaching. Further, no very
serious danger was to be anticipated from our U-boats, as most of them were
away on distant enterprises.
The English High Command, however, must have had a much
higher estimate of the damage our destroyers and U-boats could do than was
actually the case. It appears also that their confidence in the achievements of
their own submarines, which were the foundation for the execution of any such
plan, was not very great. At the outset, therefore, considerations prevailed on
both sides which led the Commands to hold back their fleets from battle. The
overestimate of the submarine danger played a most important rôle.
The German Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Ingenohl, gave
expression to his view of the general situation on August 14 in the following
Order of the Day:
" All the information we have received about the English
naval forces points to the fact that the English Battle Fleet avoids the North
Sea entirely and keeps far beyond range of our own forces. The sweep of our
brave U-boats beyond the Lat. 60° in the north and as far as the entrance
to the English Channel in the south, as well as the raids of our destroyers and
aeroplanes, have confirmed this information. Only between the Norwegian and
Scottish coasts and off the entrance to the English Channel are English forces
patrolling. Otherwise in the rest of the North Sea not a single English ship
has been found hitherto.
"This behaviour on the part of our enemy forces us to the
conclusion that he himself intends to avoid the losses he fears he may suffer
at our hands and to compel us to come with our battleships to his coast and
there fall a victim to his mines and submarines.
" We are not going to oblige our enemy thus. But they must,
and will, come to us some day or other. And then will be the day of reckoning.
On that day of reckoning we must be there with all our battleships.
"Our immediate task is therefore to cause our enemy losses
by all the methods of guerilla warfare and at every point where we can find
him, so that we can thus compel him to join battle with us.
"This task will fall primarily to our light forces
(U-boats, destroyers, mine-layers and cruisers) whose prospects of success
increase the darker and longer the nights become.
"The bold action of our mine-layer Konigin Luise, which did
the enemy material damage before she came to her glorious end, and the
audacious cruises of our U-boats have already made a beginning. Further
enterprises will follow.
" The duty of those of us in the battleships of the Fleet
is to keep this, our main weapon, sharp and bright for the decisive battle
which we shall have to fight. To that end we must work with unflinching
devotion to get our ships perfectly ready in every respect, to think out and
practice everything that can be of the slightest help and prepare for the day
on which the High Sea Fleet will be permitted to engage a numerically superior
enemy in battle for our beloved Emperor who has created this proud Fleet as a
shield for our dear Fatherland, in full confidence in the efficiency which we
have acquired by unflagging work in time of peace.
"The test of our patience, which the conduct of the enemy
imposes upon is, is hard, having regard to the martial spirit which animates
all our ships' companies as it animates our army also, a spirit which impels us
to instant action.
"The moment the enemy comes within our range he shall find
us waiting for him. Yet we must not let him prescribe the time and place for us
but ourselves choose what is favourable for a complete victory.
"It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold
ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."
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