Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans
of the Mexican War General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived
PlanJohnston reinforces Beauregard and approves his PlansGeneral
Bernard E. BeeAnalysis of the FightSuperb Work of the Federal
ArtilleryChristening of " Stonewall Jackson"McDowell's Gallant
Effort to recover Lost PowerBefore he was shorn of his Artillery he was
the Samson of the FieldThe floutCriticism of McDowellTyler's
Reconnoissance Ability of the Commanding Generals tested.
BEFORE treating of future operations, I should note the
situation of the Confederate contingents in the Shenandoah Valley and at Acquia
Creek. The latter was ordered up to reinforce Beauregard as soon as the advance
from Washington took definite shape, and arrived as a supporting brigade to his
right on the 19th of July. At the same time orders were sent authorizing
Johnston's withdrawal from the Valley, to join with Beauregard for the
approaching conflict. The use of these contingents was duly considered by both
sides some days before the campaign was put on foot.
Opposing Johnston in the Valley was General Robert
Patterson, of Philadelphia, a veteran of the war of 1812 and of the Mexican
War, especially distinguished in the latter by the prestige of the former
service. Johnston was a veteran of the Mexican War, who had won distinction by
progressive service and was well equipped in the science of war. Beauregard and
McDowell were also veterans of the Mexican War, of staff service, and
distinguished for intelligent action and attainments, both remarkable for
physical as well as mental power.
Between Johnston and Beauregard the Blue Ridge stretched out
from the Potomac- southwest far below the southern line of Virginia, cut
occasionally by narrow passes, quite defensible by small bodies of infantry and
artillery. Patterson was ordered to hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell
should direct his strength against Beauregard. McDowell seems to have accepted
that order as not only possible, but sure of success, while the Confederates
viewed the question from the other side, in a reverse light, and, as will
presently appear, with better judgment.
So far as it is possible to project a battle before reaching
the field, it seems that McDowell had concluded upon the move finally made
before setting out on his march from Washington. It was to give him an open
field, with superior numbers and appointments, and when successful was to give
him the approach to the base line of his adversary with fine prospects of
cutting off retreat. His ride to view the approaches of the Confederate right
on the morning of the 18th was made to confirm his preconceived plan. The
reconnoissance made by Tyler on the same morning reinforced his judgment, so
that the strategic part of the campaign was concluded on that morning, except
as to the means to be adopted to secrete or mislead in his movement as long as
possible, leaving, we may say, the result to tactical operations. But tactics
is time, and more decisive of results than strategy when wisely adjusted.
Johnston was sixty miles away from Beauregard, but the delay
of three days, for McDowell's march via Sudley Springs, so reduced the distance
in time and space as to make the consolidation easy under well-organized
transportation facilities. Holmes's brigade and six-gun battery were posted in
rear of Ewell's brigade.
General McDowell's order for battle on the 21st of July was
issued on the afternoon of the 20th, directing his First Division to march by
the Warrenton Turnpike, and make a diversion against the crossing of Bull Run
at the Stone Bridge, while the Second and Third Divisions, following on the
turnpike, were to file to the right, along the farm road, about half-way
between Centreville and the bridge, cross Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and bear
down against the Confederate rear and left; the First Division, under Tyler, to
march at two o'clock in the morning, to be closely followed by the others under
Hunter and Heintzelman; the turning divisions, after crossing, to march down,
clear the bridge, and lift Tyler over the Run, bringing the three into compact
battle order.
General Johnston came in from the Shenandoah Valley on the
20th with the brigades of Bee, Bartow, and Jackson. The brigades were assigned
by Beauregard, the former two in reserve near the right of Blackburn's Ford,
the latter near its left.
Beauregard's order for battle, approved by General Johnston,
was issued at five A.M. on the 21 st,the brigades at Union Mills Ford to
cross and march by the road leading towards Centreville, and in rear of the
Federal reserve at that point; the brigades at McLean's Ford to follow the move
of those on their right, and march on a converging road towards Centreville;
those at and near Blackburn's to march in co-operative action with the brigades
on the right; the reserve brigades and troops at Mitchell's Ford to be used as
emergency called, but in the absence of special orders to seek the most active
point of battle.
This order was only preliminary, coupled with the condition
that the troops were to be held ready to move, but to wait for the special
order for action. The brigade at Blackburn's Ford had been reinforced by the
Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones and Colonel Kemper. I crossed the Run under the five
o'clock order, adjusted the regiments to position for favorable action, and
gave instructions for their movements on the opening of the battle.
While waiting for the order to attack, a clever
reconnoissance was made by Colonels Terry and Lubbock, Texans, on the brigade
staff; which disclosed the march of the heavy columns of the Federals towards
our left. Their report was sent promptly to head-quarters, and after a short
delay the brigade was ordered back to its position behind the Run.
Tyler's division moved early on the 21st towards the Stone
Bridge. The march was not rapid, but timely. His first shells went tearing
through the elements over the heads of the Confederates before six o'clock. The
Second and Third Divisions followed his column till its rear cleared the road
leading up to the ford at Sudley Springs, when they filed off on that route.
McDowell was with them, and saw them file off on their course, and followed
their march. His Fifth Division and Richardson's brigade of the First were left
in reserve at Centreville, and the Fourth Division was left in a position
farther rearward. The march of the columns over the single track of the farm
road leading up to Sudley Springs was not only fatiguing, but so prolonged the
diversion of Tyler's division at the bridge as to expose its real intent, and
cause his adversary to look elsewhere for the important work. Viewing the zone
of operations as far as covered by the eye, Evans discovered a column of dust
rising above the forest in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. This, with the busy
delay of Tyler in front of the bridge, exposed the plans, and told of another
quarter for the approaching battle; when Evans, leaving four companies of
infantry and two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, moved with the rest
of his command to meet the approaching columns off his left. Bearing in mind
his care of the bridge, it was necessary to occupy grounds north of the pike.
The position chosen was the plateau near the Matthews House, about a thousand
yards north of the pike, and about the same distance from Bull Run, commending
the road by which the turning divisions of the enemy were to approach. His
artillery (two six-pound guns) was posted to his right and left, somewhat
retired. Meanwhile, Tyler's batteries maintained their position at and below
the Stone Bridge, as did those near the lower fords. McDowell's column crossed
at Sudley's Ford at nine o'clock, and approached Evans a few minutes before
ten. The leading division under Hunter, finding Evans's command across its
route, advanced the Second Rhode Island Regiment and battery of six guns of
Burnside's brigade to open the way. Evans's infantry and artillery met the
advance, and after a severe fight drove it back to the line of woodland, when
Burnside, reinforced by his other three regiments, with them advanced eight
guns. This attack was much more formidable, and pressed an hour or more before
their forces retired to the woodland. The fight, though slackened, continued,
while the brigade under Porter advanced to Burnside's support.
Waiting some time to witness the opening of his aggressive
fight towards Centreville, Beauregard found at last that his battle order had
miscarried. While yet in doubt as to the cause of delay, his attention was
drawn to the fight opened by McDowell against Evans. This affair, increasing in
volume, drew him away from his original point and object of observation. He
reconsidered the order to attack at Centreville, and rode for the field just
opening to severe work. The brigades of Bee and Bartow,commanded by
Bee,and Jackson's, had been drawn towards the left, the former two near
Cocke's position, and Jackson from the right to the left of Mitchell's Ford.
They were to await orders, but were instructed, and intrusted, in the absence
of orders, to seek the place where the fight was thickest. About twelve o'clock
that splendid soldier, Bernard E. Bee, under orders to find the point of
danger, construed it as calling him to Evans's support, and marched, without
other notice than the noise of increasing battle, with his own and Bartow's
brigades and Imboden's battery. The move against the enemy's reserve at
Centreville suspended, Colonels Terry and Lubbock, volunteer aides, crossed the
Run to make another reconnoissance of the positions about Centreville. Captain
Goree, of Texas, and Captain Sorrel, of Georgia, had also joined the brigade
staff. As Bee approached Evans he formed line upon the plateau at the Henry
House, suggesting to Evans to withdraw to that as a better field than the
advance ground held by the latter; but in deference to Evans's care for the
bridge, which involved care for the turnpike, Bee yielded, and ordered his
troops to join Evans's advance. Imboden's artillery, however, failed to
respond, remaining on the Henry plateau; leaving Bee and Evans with two
six-pounder smoothbore guns to combat the enemy's formidable batteries of eight
to twelve guns of superior metal, as well as the accumulating superior infantry
forces, Imboden's battery making a show of practice with six-pounders at great
range. Bee's infantry crossed Young's Branch under severe fire, and were posted
on the line of Evans's battle.
Burnside was reinforced by Porter's brigade, and afterwards
by a part of Heintzelman's division. Ricketts's battery, and subsequently the
battery under Griffin, pressed their fight with renewed vigor. The batteries,
particularly active and aggressive, poured incessant fire upon the Confederate
ranks, who had no artillery to engage against them except Imboden's, far off to
the rear, and the section of Latham's howitzers. The efforts of the Federal
infantry were cleverly met and resisted, but the havoc of those splendid
batteries was too severe, particularly Griffin's, that had an oblique fire upon
the Confederates. It was the fire of this battery that first disturbed our
ranks on their left, and the increasing pounding of that and Ricketts's
eventually unsettled the line. At this juncture two brigades of Tyler's
division, with General W. T. Sherman and General Keyes, crossed the Run at a
ford some distance above the bridge and approached the Confederate right,
making more unsettled their position. At the same time the attacking artillery
and infantry followed up their opportunity in admirable style, pushed the
Confederates back, and pursued down to the valley of Young's Branch.
At one P.M., Colonels Terry and Lubbock returned from their
reconnoissance of the ground in front of Centreville, with a diagram showing
points of the Union lines and troops there posted. I sent it up to
head-quarters, suggesting that the brigades at the lower fords be put across
the Run, and advance against the reserves as designed by the order of the
morning. Colonel Terry returned with the suggestion approved, and we
communicated the same to the brigades at McLean's and Union Mills Fords,
commanded by officers of senior dates to myself. The brigades were prepared,
however, for concert of action. Bee, Bartow, and Evans made valorous efforts,
while withdrawing from their struggle on the Matthews plateau, to maintain the
integrity of their lines, and with some success, when General Wade Hampton came
with his brigade to their aid, checked the progress of pursuit, and helped to
lift their broken ranks to the plateau at the Henry House. The fight assumed
proportions which called for the care of both General Johnston and General
Beauregard, who, with the movements of their right too late to relieve the
pressure of the left, found it necessary to draw their forces to the point at
which the battle had been forced by the enemy. At the same time the reserve
brigades of their right were called to the left. General Thomas J. Jackson also
moved to that quarter, and reached the rear crest of the plateau at the Henry
House while yet Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Hampton were climbing to the forward
crest. Quick to note a proper ground, Jackson deployed on the crest at the
height, leaving the open of the plateau in front. He was in time to secure the
Imboden battery before it got off the field, and put it into action. Stanard's
battery, Pendleton's, and Pelham's, and part of the Washington Artillery were
up in time to aid Jackson in his new formation and relieve our discomfited
troops rallying on his flank. As they rose on the forward crest, Bee saw, on
the farther side, Jackson's line, serene as if in repose, affording a haven so
promising of cover that he gave the christening of " Stonewall" for the
immortal Jackson.
" There," said he, "is Jackson, standing like a stone wall."
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