IT may not be out of place here to touch upon the general
naval situation in the spring of 1916that is, on the eve of the Battle of
Jutland. What were the strategical conditions? To what extent was it
justifiable to take risks with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks the full
consequences of which could not be foreseen owing to the new conditions of
naval warfare?
The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our available
capital ships. There was very little in the way of reserve behind it. The
battleships not included in the Grand Fleet were all of them pre-Dreadnoughts
and therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted of seven ships of the "
King Edward VII." class, two ships of the " Lord Nelson" class, and four of the
"Queen" class, all of these ships being in the Mediterranean except five of the
"King Edward VII." class. They were required there either for work with the
Italian Fleet or for the operations in the Ægean. Five of our light
cruisers were also in the Mediterranean.
The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in the
Mediterranean, but, owing to political considerations and their duty in
watching the Austrian Fleet, there was little prospect of their leaving that
locality.
It is interesting to compare this situation with that
existing a century earlier. In September, 1805, the month before Trafalgar, the
disposition of British ships in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean
is given in the following table :
Station |
Commander-in-Chief |
Ships of the Line |
Frigates |
Sloops and small vessels |
Total |
From Shetland to Beachy Head |
Lord Keith |
10 |
15 |
155 |
180 |
Channel |
Port Admirals |
- |
1 |
51 |
52 |
Guernsey and Jersey |
Sir J. Saumarez |
- |
2 |
12 |
14 |
Off Ushant, etc. |
Admiral Cornwallis |
26 |
15 |
20 |
61 |
Irish |
Lord Gardner |
- |
10 |
14 |
24 |
Mediterranean |
Lord Nelson |
26 |
19 |
24 |
69 |
In port refitting and destined to reinforce Lords
Nelson and Cornwallis |
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In addition to Nelson's force of 26 capital ships and 19
frigates, the Navy had, therefore, in commission in home waters and the
Mediterranean a yet more numerous force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates.
The main portion of this force was with Cornwallis off Ushant, and was watching
Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had 155 sloops and small
vessels.
In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital ships
(including battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light cruisers, we had in
commission in home waters and the Mediterranean only 13 capital ships (all of
pre-Dreadnought types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light cruisers.
Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had, exclusive of the Grand Fleet and
Harwich force, about 60 destroyers (mostly of old types), 6 P boats, and 33 old
torpedo boats.
In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the line in
England, besides 10 under construction in Russia, and 36 frigates. In May,
1916, we had building five capital ships and about nine light cruisers.
A consideration of these figures will show that the
situation at these two periods was very different, in that, in 1805, the force
engaged at Trafalgar was only a relatively small portion of the available
British Fleet; yet Mahan has declared that ''Nelson's far distant, storm-beaten
ships on which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion
of the world." In 1916 the Grand Fleet included the large majority of the
vessels upon which the country had to rely for safety.
Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I had
written to the Admiralty pointing out the dangers to the Grand Fleet which an
intelligent use of submarines, mines and torpedoes by the Germans, before and
during a Fleet action, would involve, and had stated the tactics which I had
intended to employ to meet the expected German movement in order to bring the
enemy to action in the shortest practicable time and with the best chance of
achieving such a victory as would be decisive. I stated that with new and
untried methods of warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.
I received in reply an expression of approval of my views
and of confidence in the manner in which I proposed to handle the Fleet in
action.
Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did our margin
of superiority justify me in disregarding the enemy's torpedo fire or meeting
it otherwise than by definite movements deduced after most careful analysis of
the problem at sea with the Fleet and on the tactical board.
The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet were
taken into account; and there was also a possibility that the Grand Fleet might
later be called upon to confront a situation of much wider scope than that
already existing.
The position gradually improved after 1916. During the
latter half of that year the remaining ships of the "Royal Sovereign" class
joined the Grand Fleet, and greatly increased the ratio of strength of the
Fleet as compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it was also possible
to withdraw the four battleships of the " Queen " class from the Adriatic. This
much eased the manning situation. And in April, 1917, the culminating event was
the entry of the United States of America into the War on the side of the
Entente. In December, 1917, the United States sent a division of battleships to
join the Grand Fleet, and it was apparent that we could count upon the whole
battleship strength of the United States Navy, if required, to second our
efforts.
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light
cruiser and destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet increased steadily after the
Battle of Jutland, and to a very considerable extent reduced the danger of
successful torpedo attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface craft. The
inclusion of the K. class submarinessubmarines of high speedin the
Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very probable that any losses suffered by us by
submarine attack would be more than compensated by enemy losses from the same
cause.
In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in regard
to battle cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory, the general effect of all these
considerations upon the tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be
overwhelming. The position was assured, and we could have afforded to take
risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most unwise. |