When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was
about this: the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth ; the
line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of that
river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the
Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the
Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and
Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia
was in our hands; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east
of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress ' Monroe and
Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina;
Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in
South Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola
in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was
still in the hands of the enemy.
Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military
division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of
the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about
Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the
commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This
arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of
communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these
different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or
unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the
orders of the division commander.
In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the
same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began;
they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true,
footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North
Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either
side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in
war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to
Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results,
sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army;
but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the
Southern press if not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole,
did not discourage these claims ; a portion of it always magnified rebel
success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in
their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of
the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with
whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete.
That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in
guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The
Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same
river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general
in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up with
many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where
bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad
after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with
adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond,
so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another
farther to the rear to fall back into.
To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a
foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System
and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.
The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments,
though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military
division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial
limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these
various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the
enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce
another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I
regarded the Army of the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along
the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right
wing; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all
the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter were
occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to
their numerical strength. All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to
hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners ; where they could not
do this their positions were abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men
were added to the Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General
Gillmore in command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave
his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active
service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. Officers and
soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their
proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it
accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit
was the problem..
As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in
support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General
Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an admirable
position for such a reinforcement, The corps could be brought at the last
moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on
the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate
against Richmond from that direction. In fact Burnside and the War Department
both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last
moment.
My general plan now was to concentrate all the force
possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such,
as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of
Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of
the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General
Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at
Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the Confederates had to guard the
Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line
of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid
cavalry general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger command
necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not
abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay
the ^Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the
principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on
Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their
special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them.
Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources
at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. Little expeditions
could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of
railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances.
Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman
was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective
points. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the
Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a
large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large
amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands.
Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the
valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while
advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave
us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James
River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.
Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort
Monroe. This was the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order
as to the part he was to play m the approaching campaign I invited his views.
They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct, in
writing, before leaving.
General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of
major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had
not yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by
a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that
he should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I
assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General Butler. I was not
long in finding out that the objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.
In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed
my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so
far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more
than it had done if under a thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man
in the army for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up, saying : " How
would Sheridan do?" I replied : " The very man I want." The President said I
could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his
arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the
Potomac. This relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on
that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as
any other cavalry commander.
Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble
all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move,
Mobile to be his objective.
At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I
should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his
left. Each plan presented advantages' If by his right my leftthe
Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy line over
which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position
the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if he
chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one
I would have to take in following". A movement by his leftour right
would obviate this ; but all that was done would have to be done with the
supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan
was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us
was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted
of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.
While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the
northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union
City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the
Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed
Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the
trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops
against him before he got my order. |